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# The OSCE and the institutionalization of security in Europe (1990-2006)

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Ce mémoire intitulé :

The OSCE and the institutionalization of security in Europe (1990-2006)

présenté par :

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## Résumé

En utilisant l'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE) comme étude de cas, ce mémoire présente un modèle théorique pour saisir l'institutionnalisation et les transformations des organisations internationales (OI). Ce modèle s'appuie sur le concept de manipulation stratégique des normes récemment repris par Frank Schimmelfenning. En présentant un modèle qui analyse les différentes phases de la construction et des trajectoires de développement d'une organisation internationale, ce mémoire démontre l'importance clé des luttes de pouvoir et d'influence au sein des OI qui sont reflétées dans les processus d'action rhétorique des États membres. Dans le cas de l'OSCE, différentes conceptions des règles, principes et valeurs de l'Acte final d'Helsinki ont mené les États participants à des luttes rhétoriques qui ont eu pour effet, dans une perspective de dépendance au sentier, aux conséquences actuelles, soit une crise politique ouverte menaçant la survie de l'organisation à court terme.



**Mots clés**: Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE), sécurité européenne, organisations internationales, construction institutionnelle, action rhétorique



## Abstract

Using the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a case study, this article presents a model for understanding both the institutional design and the subsequent transformations of international organizations (IGO). This model derives from a body of literature on the strategic manipulation of norms most recently exemplified by the work of Frank Schimmelfenning. By presenting a model that takes into account the different phases of the life cycle of an IGO, this paper argues that the key point to our understanding of IGOs lies in the struggle for power and influence that is reflected in the processes of shaming and framing, under the notion of rhetorical action, by members states. In the case of the OSCE, different conceptions of the rules and principles of the Helsinki Final Act led the participating states in rhetorical arguments that culminated in what, following a path dependent process, I label as unintended consequences, namely the actual political crisis and stalemate within the organization. Although this model more clearly applies to security institutions or other institutions within the realm of high politics and gives us a detailed understanding of their internal mechanisms, use of this model could also provide with better knowledge of non-security related institutions where a consensus does not exist on the normative foundations within the organization.



**Key Words**: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European security, international organizations, institutional design, rhetorical action

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*À Dominique*

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**The OSCE and the institutionalization of security in Europe (1990-2006)**

The Helsinki Final Act was signed on August 1, 1975 which marked the birth of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The particularity of this forum was that it spanned across both the communist and capitalist blocs. During the Cold War, the CSCE seemed to achieve only limited results as the tensions and opposition between both blocs appeared to limit the importance of this forum for fostering security cooperation. The Belgrade and Madrid follow-up conferences of 1977 and 1984, respectively, confirmed the limited prospects of cooperation within this dialogue forum. However, despite these difficulties the CSCE achieved its goal of maintaining closer relations between the two blocs in security related issues. Thus on the surface, a preliminary assessment would present the CSCE as a useful, but marginal, tool to deepen security cooperation between the East and the West during the Cold War.

Yet recent studies (Thomas 2001; Evers et al 2005) on the CSCE during the Cold War have demonstrated that this organization actually played an important role in the demise of communism. As such, revisiting the history of the CSCE with new empirical evidence leads to a new understanding of its achievements and role in the rapprochement of the two blocs. However, the steady decline of the C-OSCE[1] after the Cold War has been evident in this new security landscape. How then can we explain the relative failure of the OSCE in the 1990s compared to its unheralded but vital role during the Cold War?

[1] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1995. This paper will use the term OSCE to refer to the organization in general and the term CSCE will only be used when referring to the specific period between 1975 and 1990.

Two principal approaches to answer this question can be found. The first argument (Hong 1997) considers the rules, norms and principles within the organization and presents the CSCE as a security regime in formation that was well-suited for the Cold War environment, but argues that its set of rules, norms and principles were not adapted to the new security environment in the post-Cold War 1990s. The second argument considers the interests of the participating states within the organization and concludes that the European Union, the United States and Russia, the main actors, were not very interested, but for very different reasons, to use this forum to promote their security interests. This argument derives from classical interpretation of realism of which John Mearsheimer's writings are particularly close to this second interpretation (1990, 1994).

The first argument can be countered when we look at the empirical evidence. The relative failure of the OSCE has to be understood in different stages. It is not until 1995-1996 that the OSCE begins to lose its relevance. Before that, it was somewhat successful in steering the participating states in this new security environment and to build the normative foundations of this environment (Milanova 2005; Hoynck 1996).

The second argument actually paves the way for more questions. If the main actors did not have any important interests within the CSCE, why did it survive? Why was it not abandoned when its purpose, to foster cooperation across the two blocs and to serve as a forum for dialogue between the East and the West, was accomplished?

Here, three different answers can again be differentiated. First, some have argued that institutions never die, and that, amongst other elements, bureaucratic resistance shapes the battleground and forces the main actors to not abandon completely the organization (Strange 1998). Some have argued that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the conflicts that emerged of these successive disintegrations, have given a new set of objectives and targets for the organization (Héraclides 1993, Kemp 1998). Finally, some have argued that the main actors eventually lost interest in the organization, explaining its slow decline after 1995-1996 (Ghébali 2002; Mlyn 2003; Hopmann 2000). This last argument is usually explained by presenting the European security architecture after the Cold War. With the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in this security landscape, the OSCE was gradually left at the margin of this institutional dynamic (Ghébali et al 2004; Plate 1999).

Again, these explanations only complicate our puzzle. How then can we explain the evolution of the main actors' position regarding the OSCE and their security interests within it? How can we explain the dual influence of the international environment and the changing security dynamics on one side and of the main actors' interests on the other side? More importantly, how do these factors account for the transformation of the OSCE after the Cold War from a security forum to an almost full-fledged international organization?

In short, what accounts for the transformation of the OSCE and its relative but steady decline in the 1990s?

This is the objective of this paper: to understand the factors that shaped this transformation and explain how exactly they influenced this transformation. This project has two related goals: to provide an analytical framework that offers a sufficiently complete and broad understanding of the factors behind the OSCE transformation and to presents an analysis and a detailed description of this empirical transformation.

This research follows a simple design. First, a literature review is done in order to assess what we know about the OSCE, what we don't know and what we want to know. This literature review is divided in two parts.

The first aspect of this literature review consists of looking at theoretical explanations of the OSCE after the Cold War. This literature review builds on the review essay on the state of the art of OSCE studies by Michael Merlingen (2003). Merlingen reviewed four books published in 2001 concerning the OSCE and discusses the lack of theoretical studies on the OSCE. He states that most research on the OSCE has been concerned with practical and empirical assessments of the OSCE, or in other words, mostly descriptive research. He then makes an argument toward refocusing the study of the OSCE toward theoretically informed analysis of the OSCE. This part of the literature review thus seeks to find what has been done theoretically about the OSCE and provide an up-to-date perspective on OSCE studies.

The second part of the literature review departs from specific OSCE-related research. This section reviews the literature on the formation, design and impacts of international institutions in international relations theories. It uses the rationalist-constructivist divide as a starting point and tries to give a summary of different explanations of international organizations in the world.

After this literature review which consists of the first chapter of this thesis, a conceptual framework is developed to explain the evolution of the OSCE after the Cold War. This model is based around a classic debate: the structure versus agency divide in international relations (Carlsnaes 1992; Wendt 1992). This model seeks to explain the different impacts of structure and actors (understood mainly as the great powers within the OSCE) and to account for both the design and evolution of the OSCE after the Cold War. Based around a rationalist setting, this model explains the design and evolution of the OSCE by evaluating the influence of the great powers within the OSCE (France, Germany, Great-Britain, Russia and United States) on this evolution and by determining the amount of constraints, understood as structural factors limiting the choices of these actors, present on them. The central explanatory argument lies within this actor-centric explanation where the great powers act according to their own national interests and where international organizations are viewed as a mean for the advancement of these national interests, limited only partially by structural explanations.

The framework used here is a variant of Schimmelfenning's (2001; 2003) interpretation of Goffmann's sociological work. It starts with rationalist assumptions and then takes into account the influence of the changing normative

environment and the use by states of the liberal-democratic norms to shape and constrain (with framing and shaming techniques) other actors to follow a course of action that reflects the interests and position of the first actor.

The main hypothesis of this project is two-fold. This project first argues that the transformation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has been mostly influenced by the liberal democratic norms present in the Western (or euro-Atlantic) security community. However, these norms were not integrated as part of a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998), and thus not internalized by the East European and post-Soviet countries. Instead, it is the manipulative, strategic and rational use of these norms – through the concept of rhetorical action - that accounts for the way the OSCE has redesigned itself.

The second argument that this project develops is that this particular process of institutionalization led inevitably – in a path-dependent process (Thelen et al 1992, Pierson 2000) – to the actual crisis and the stagnation of this organization, the main consequence of its internal evolution that we see today.

Thus, the deliberate and strategic use of the liberal democratic norms by the different participating states within the OSCE not only shaped its institutionalization process, but also had the consequence of recreating new dividing lines within this organization and in turn provides the background for the ongoing crisis within the OSCE.

The independent variable is the behaviours of the members' states and the dependent variable is the change within the organization. The normative environment serves as an intervening variable to understand the way the behaviour of members' states is shaped.

After these two chapters, the literature review and the conceptual framework, it will be possible to evaluate empirically the validity of the conceptual framework.

The third chapter analyzes the national interests of the states within the OSCE and the outcomes of the OSCE evolution after the Cold War. This will be done by taking into account the secondary literature on different elements of the evolution of the OSCE, but mainly by using archives documents from the OSCE. Using these archives, the evolution of the OSCE is divided in several phases or critical junctures. In the archives, the focus is on the documents that highlight the roles and positions played by the great powers at five key points of the evolution of the OSCE after the Cold War. First, this section looks at the adoption of the Charter of Paris in 1990 and the process of institutionalization of the OSCE within the Helsinki Summit (1992). The second and third moments will look at the adoption of the Charter for European Security in 1999, starting with the Security Model discussions around 1995-1996. The fourth moment will be the ongoing budget crisis that has created more obstacles since 2001. The fifth moment that will be studied is the recent panel of eminent persons on transforming the OSCE (2005) and the debate concerning the role of the OSCE after its 30$^{th}$ anniversary.

These moments cover the entire institutionalization process that the OSCE has undergone since the end of the Cold War. First, it follows the OSCE at different moments from 1990 to 2006. Second, it addresses issues that cover different roles and functions of the OSCE: human rights and democratization, military aspects and economic and environmental issues. Third, it looks at events that are both inward looking (that is that they involve the structure of the organization itself) and outward looking (that is that it involves dealing with specific aspects of security in Europe, for example the field missions).

It will then be possible to assess the merits and limits of the conceptual framework used here. The concluding remarks of this paper evaluate the model using the findings made in this study, highlight the relevance of this research both for students of the OSCE and students of international organizations and seek to push the research agenda further.

# Chapter I

## Merits and limits of OSCE studies

The first chapter of this dissertation focuses on two separate (but related) literature review on the OSCE and the influence of international organizations in general. More specifically, the objective of this literature review is to assess the current state of the affairs concerning the study of the OSCE and how this relates to the actual debates in international relations concerning the design and the effects of international organizations. This in turn will be used to develop a relevant analytical framework, in chapter two, for the study of the evolution of the OSCE after the Cold War (1990-2006). However, this chapter begins with an overview of the OSCE since 1975 in order to provide a framework of reference to this study.

After this brief introduction, a classification, in section I, of the relevant literature on the OSCE is done: descriptive studies, prescriptive studies and constructivist-oriented studies. Then, the second section focuses on expanding the discussion on the state of the affairs within the OSCE by engaging a debate on theoretical grounds. More precisely, this section builds on recent comments by Michael Merlingen (2003) who mentioned that studies on the OSCE tend to be undertheorized and remain mainly on empirical and descriptive grounds. He underlined two key elements in his discussion. First is the notion that this empirical bias has limited the analytical power of recent OSCE studies :

> Much of the research on the C/OSCE is informed by an empiricist conception of knowledge production that long ago fell out of favour in mainline international relations scholarship. Research proceeds as if the world could be known as it really is, i.e., as if observational predicates were isomorphs of sensual objects rather than theoretically constituted elements of inquiry. (Merlingen 2003 ; 81) and also "This lack of theoretical orientation limits the ability of analysts to appreciate the interpretative possibilities in the empirical material, restricting them in what they are able to notice and say about the organisation. (Merligen 2003 ; 71)

The second element is that more research based on international relations theories is needed to gain a better understanding of the OSCE: "The more general point I wanted to make is that, irrespective of the theoretical perspective chosen by scholars, there is a need for a theoretical turn in OSCE studies." (Merligen 2003 ; 81)

However, Merlingen's article deals only with a very small sample of OSCE literature (his review consists of four books, all published in 2001 : Ghebali and Warner ; Kemp ; Thomas ; Zellner and Lange). As such, before accepting his conclusions, an in-depth literature review needs to be accomplished in order to gain a broader perpective of OSCE studies. The second section reviews research that are theory-driven or that make a substantive use of theory in order to analyze the OSCE. This section also finds that, with only a few exceptions, much of the theoretically engaged work on the OSCE uses a constructivist framework.

The third section differs in scope from the previous literature review of this chapter. Instead of reviewing studies that concentrate on the OSCE, this section deals with the literature on the current theoretical debates about the design and the effects of international organizations. It thus offers a broader view on how

one might use *different* theories in order to study the OSCE. As such, it seeks to offer a balance to the dominant constructivist trend within OSCE studies. It proceeds as follows. First, an overview of the three main theoretical schools of thought in international relations' insights on international organizations is made. Then, a few examples of theoretical framework are analyzed. Finally, a review of recent attempts at bridge-building between the rationalist-constructivist divide and an assessment of this subfield is made.

## A brief description of the OSCE

Before providing a literature review on the OSCE, both in empirical and theoretical grounds, it is essential to define the OSCE and its main evolution since its creation in 1975. Here, three main phases of the process are discussed. First, the origins of the CSCE (1954-1975) are sketched, complemented with a description of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Second, the period between 1975 and 1989, consisting of the follow-up meetings and the so-called Helsinki process are described. Finally, the consequences of the demise of communism on the CSCE (especially the Charter of Paris and the second Helsinki conference, respectively in 1990 and 1992) are analyzed. A final part of this overview puts forward a definition of the OSCE's comprehensive agenda for security in Europe.

### *The origins of the CSCE : 1954-1975*

The origins of a paneuropean conference are usually traced back to a 1954 Soviet proposal to confirm the end of the Second World war and the borders resulting from it. The Molotov project was rejected by the West on the basis that

it would undermine the NATO alliance and that it did not fully include the United States (which would have only been observers). This initial rejection of the proposal by the West led to a period of hibernation and, in the 1960s, to a series of propositions from the Eastern bloc to develop a paneuropean conference on security cooperation across the two blocs. Following the Harmel report on the role of NATO towards Eastern Europe in 1967, this idea of a paneuropean conference on security and cooperation was steadily making its way across the divided Europe. With the Cold War reaching a détente period, this idea became even more interesting for both sides. In 1970, the foundations of the conference were laid when the Soviet agreed to several conditions concerning Germany and the participation of the United States as full participant and also when negotiations concerning arms reductions were reached between the two superpowers. Thus in 1972, the tasks of organizing a paneuropean conference on security and cooperation began in Dipoli, near Helsinki (Maresca 1985; Ghébali 1989; Bloed 1990, 1993; Rotfeld 1996).

Negotiated in three phases between 1972-1975, the Helsinki negotiations between the 35 countries of both the Eastern and Western bloc faced many obstacles and challenges and the result is an hybrid compromise between the two blocs. At the end of the negotiation stage however, this loosely organized forum between participating states from the East and West with follow-up meetings during the Cold War was viewed at the time as complete victory for the USSR[2]. In this view, the West accepted the principles of the inviolability of borders and only got empty declarations and principles concerning human rights. But between 1975

[2] This view was reflected in newspaper headlines urging the president of the United States Gerald Ford not to sign the Final act : "Jerry don't go" (Wall Street Journal editorial July 21, 1975, taken from Thomas 2001)

and the end of the Cold War, the dissidents in the Soviet bloc used the Helsinki Final Act, and especially Principle VII of the Decalogue concerning human rights, to undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. This so-called Helsinki effect, which has played an important role in the demise of communism, has been largely documented both at the macro level and the micro level. [3]

The Helsinki Final Act was signed in Helsinki, August 1, 1975. It is separated in three Baskets. Basket one comprises the politico-military dimension including peaceful resolution mechanisms, the concept of a cooperative security and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). Basket two links the participants in the economic and scientific fields. Basket three is the human rights aspect of this Final Act. Noteworthy is Principle VII of the Final act that deals with "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief". (Final Act, OSCE Documentation)

*The Helsinki process 1975-1989*

Between August 1975 and 1989, follow-up meetings to the CSCE were organized. A brief summary of the input and output of these follow-up meetings is sufficient to present an overview of the achievements of the CSCE during the ebb and flow of the détente. The first follow-up meeting in Belgrade (1977-78) achieved little results due to the increasing tensions between the Soviet Union (regarding their interventions in Africa) and the United States (with the new Carter doctrine on human rights) (Ghébali 1989). The 1984 Madrid meeting was more successful and started the negotiations on disarmament that led to new

[3] For a detailed account, see Daniel Thomas, *The Helsinki effect*, Princeton University 2001

Security Confidence Building Measures (Ghébali 1989; Bloed 1990, 1993). The final meeting of the CSCE during the Cold War was the Vienna Meeting that lasted 3 years, 1986-1989. This final meeting served as an open dialogue forum during the final years of the Cold War and made more advances in the domain of arms control and human rights dimension (Lehne 1991; Bloed 1990, 1993).

*After the demise of communism (1990-1992)*

The final phase of this overview starts with the demise of communism and ends with the Second Helsinki Summit in 1992. In 1990, the CSCE played a prominent role to mark the end of the Cold War by signing the Charter of Paris for a new Europe which, in the spirit of euphoria of the time, reiterated the Helsinki Final Act principles and called for the creation of a new Europe, free, democratic and guided by the norms stated 15 years ago in Helsinki : "The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended." and also "Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades" (Charter of Paris, 1990)

However, the events did not unfold according to this new vision of Europe described in the Charter and in 1992, when the second Helsinki Summit started, the mood was grim, conflicts had erupted once again in Europe. Division, once again, was there. As such, the CSCE's role and mandate that seemed to have been fulfilled in 1990 with the end of the Cold War proved to be still relevant[4]. These dramatic changes in the context of European security enabled the CSCE to redesign itself from a Cold War forum to an almost full-fledged international

[4] I thank Walter Kemp for making this point.

organization capable of dealing with new threats and new conceptions of security after the Cold War.

This institutionalization process was reflected both on a political and operational levels.[5] The new political will to provide security in this new environment of conflicts (both ethnic in the Balkans and internal in the post-Soviet countries) made possible the development of a permanent organization with a secretariat, different bodies acting either on behalf of the member states (the Permanent Council and its previous incarnations) or directly for the organization (the Chairman-in-Office, the Troika) and annual meetings at the ministerial levels and ad hoc summits at the head of state level. On the operational level, the OSCE developed new structures based on the three dimensions of the Final Act to cope with the new emerging threats. The High Commissioner on National Minorities was established in 1992 to provide support to participating states in resolving ethnic tensions or conflicts. Other structures were also created: the Conflict Prevention Center, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Coordinator for Economic and Environmental issues (OSCE Documentation).

*A conceptual definition of the CSCE/OSCE*

As can be seen from this chronological description of the CSCE during the Cold War, the CSCE's agenda for security can be summarized as comprehensive and cooperative and the development of the CSCE from a forum to an

[5] For a general overview of the structure of the OSCE, see the OSCE chart available online at http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2006/01/13554_53_fr.pdf

international organization is closely linked to the chain of events between 1975 and 1992. This final part highlights the key elements of both these aspects.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was renamed the OSCE in 1995 at the Budapest Summit) has become the largest regional security organization with 56[6] participating states from Vancouver to Vladivostok, including the United States. Created during the détente years of the Cold War, the Helsinki Final Act formed the basis of the CSCE. This document enshrined three sets of principles: on human rights, on politico-military affairs and on economic, scientific and environmental issues. As such this compromise between the Soviet bloc (which gained the principle of the integrity of borders and territories) and the West (which forced the inclusion of human rights issues in the Final Act) was seen as part of the political process of the Cold War and the détente. (OSCE Documentation)

The foundations of the CSCE are its comprehensive agenda and its global reach. Comprehensive is understood both in terms of the wide scope of security issues (hum an rights, economic, scientific and environmental issues, politico-military aspects) and the links it tries to make between these three dimensions. Its global reach and cooperative aspects underlie the objective of the CSCE to be a forum of dialogue between the Eastern bloc and Western bloc and its objective to include as many participants as possible (thus its rapid expansion following the

[6] Montenegro was admitted to the OSCE on June 22, 2006 following the referendum for the state-status of Montenegro on May 21, 2006 and signed the Helsinki Final Act on September 1, 2006.

break-up of the Soviet Union and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) (OSCE Documentation).

To conclude this overview of the evolution of the C/OSCE, it is essential to put the institutionalization of this organization against the chain of events that occurred between 1975 and 1992. While the OSCE mirrored the events that led to the end of the Cold War, the OSCE managed not only to be a reflection of these historical evolutions but also to be a part of these changes and to foster cooperation and dialogue.

## Classifying the literature on the OSCE

Before it is possible to understand the relationship between theory and the OSCE literature, it is essential to frame and classify the different categories of OSCE studies. Three main approaches to the OSCE are found in the literature : descriptive studies, prescriptive studies and constructivist oriented studies.

*Category I : Descriptive studies*

The first category consists of research that simply review what is the OSCE or what does the OSCE do (or did) in a particular domain. Its main objective is to provide information on the OSCE. It answers questions of the what, who, when and how type. It is empirically oriented and is what Merlingen argues against doing (2003, 71). Consistent with the findings of Merligen, this category

is the most important quantitatively. It can be subdvided in five branches according to the aspect of the OSCE that is studied : 1 - the structures and different institutions of the OSCE, 2 - the relations between the OSCE and other international organizations, 3 - the evolution of the mandates of the OSCE, 4 - the impacts and importance of the three OSCE dimensions and 5 - the role of participating states within the OSCE. The first branch can then be subdivided again in five sections : 1 – the institutionalization of the OSCE, 2 – long term missions, 3 – summits and councils, 4 – High Commissionner on National Minorities (HCNM), 5 – Confidence and security building measures (CSBM) and the military-political documents (the CFE and the Open skies Treaty) .[7]

On a qualitative note however, this kind of analysis differs widely, with some work providing only an often vague and superficial understanding of the OSCE. In its most relevant and interesting form, research in this category enables the reader to learn the necessary information on certain specific aspects of the OSCE. This kind of research gives references on key documents not always available, or at least not easily available, mainly official documents from the OSCE archives. These documents also provide excellent background summary on the main aspects of the OSCE. However, they do not enable the reader to understand the reasons and causes that produce these facts.

In short, such studies offer an important foundation to our understanding of the OSCE but they do not offer a complete picture of the causal mecanisms. In

[7] This division can be seen in the three main publications on the OSCE: the *Helsinki Monitor* journal, the annual *OSCE yearbook* and the Selected Bibliography produced by the Center for OSCE Research (CORE) at the University of Hamburg. The classification made here, however, reflects the author's analysis of the OSCE's literature and does not necessarily follows the categories introduced in these publications.

this perspective, they are to be taken as an essential tool to understand the OSCE, not as the knowledge that provides its comprehension.

*Category II : Prescriptive studies*

The second category of policy-oriented analysis is prescriptive in nature. It discusses how the OSCE should or ought to be in the future. Another section of this prescriptive work focuses on how and why we should export the OSCE model in other parts of the world (Duffield 2001). With the never ending institutionalization process of the OSCE and the permanent changes made within and around the organization, this category of work has expanded in recent years and now forms an important part of the OSCE literature. It is for this reason that it is included in this literature review. However, due to its policy-oriented nature, this body of work does not fit within the objectives of this text. It is however important for two things. First, it sheds light on what is important empirically within the OSCE. As such, because it focuses on specific and important aspects of how the OSCE should be, these policy-oriented studies direct our attention to these elements and help us identify what is important to study. Related to this, it forces a student of the OSCE to be aware of the practical implications of his work.

In short, research on the OSCE should be able to answer questions that are important for the OSCE community and has some practical considerations. This will make sure that work done on the OSCE is not method or theory driven, but also problem-driven.

*Category III : Constructivist –oriented studies*

The third and final category of OSCE studies consists of theoretical work on the OSCE. However, much of the theoretically-related work on the OSCE uses a constructivist framework, with only a few exceptions (Grussendorf 1998, Mottola 1997, Mosser 2001, Remacle 1995). Since the objective of this literature review is to grasp the theoretical dilemmas related to the OSCE, this third section is analyzed in detail in the following section.

## Thinking theoretically about the OSCE

Buidling on the contribution by Michael Merligen (2003) on the state of the art of the OSCE studies, this section reviews research that analyzes the OSCE from a theoretical perspective or by using substantive theoretical elements to develop the arguments made. A preliminary assessment effectively tends towards reaffirming Merligen's conclusion. Few OSCE related studies are theoretically driven, and this state of the field reflects the trend discussed in the previous section : a concentration of descriptive and prescriptive material on the OSCE. However, among the few studies discussed here that focus on IR theories, the starting point is usually a constructivist framework. This constructivist literature can be divided in several categories : the role of norms within the OSCE (Thomas 2001; Flynn and Farrell 1999; Leatherman 2003), the socialization effect of the OSCE (Merligen and Ostrauskai 2004, 2005; Kelley 2004), the role of power within the OSCE (Merligen 2003; Tudyka 2000), the security community dimension of the OSCE (Hong 1996; Adler 1998). Even though the most frequent starting point is constructivism, some authors use different approaches such as

rationalism and realism (Remacle 1995) or a combination / synthesis of different approaches (Grussendorf 1998; Mottola 1997; Mosser 2001) .

This section reviews the different categories of constructivist research highlighted in this paragraph and other theoretically-engaged studies on the OSCE in order to offer a more comprehensive state of the art on the OSCE literature.

*The role of norms within the OSCE*

Three authors (Thomas 2001; Leatherman 2003; Flynn and Farrell 1999) attempt to link the OSCE to a normative framework. While they differ as to which norm mattered and how it mattered, they all share the assumption of a logic of approprieteness (March and Olsen 1998).

Of the four books Merligen (2003) reviewed, only one qualifies as a theoretically problem-driven approach : Daniel Thomas's *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (2001). Even though this book studies the CSCE process during the Cold War, the impact it had and the relevance of the theoretical framework makes it a worthwhile starting point. Thomas uses a constructivist framework to study three elements of the Helsinki Final Act: "the evolution, framing and effects of human rights norms" (20). He argues that one of the principal effect of the Final Act is the demise of communism through, in part, the framing and effects of human rights norms present in 1975 in the Final Act. This Helsinki effect is thus an essential part of the puzzle to understand the end of the Cold War.

Janie Leatherman (2003) develops an analytical framework to understand the role of third parties within the CSCE and their effects on peaceful change. She argues that the Neutral and Non-Aligned Movement within the CSCE (the N+N) were the driving force in implementing norms for peaceful change within the CSCE. By using a model of mediation between the N+N and the two superpowers, Leatherman (2003) explains the role of the N+N in the internalization of this peaceful change norm. She concludes by arguing that the N+N were the most successful actors in institutionalizing within the CSCE forum the norms for peaceful change.

The article by Flynn and Farrel (1999) analyses the diffusion of norms within the OSCE region during the 1990s. By using a constructivist framework to study the development of substate conflicts in the OSCE, Flynn and Farrell bring two main concepts : that norms enable states to achieve a certain behaviour and that this provides a framework where choice and agency codify the structure and the institutional development of the OSCE (thus the focus is on the states as actors in their model). In describing the evolution of the OSCE, they divide this evolution in two phases. The first phase is the codification of norms. Between 1989 and 1992, and especially during the Charter of Paris, the participating states agreed to a set of norms to be adopted in Europe (in their study of substate conflicts, the emphasis is put on the minority rights as new norms). The second phase is the diffusion of norms after 1992. This is done in two parts. First norms are adopted consciously and then internalized: initial changes to norms were consciously sought while subsequent modifications were derivative of the initial

choices. This path dependency approach to the internalization of norms fails however to explicit the mechanisms that enable this process.

In their conclusion, the authors discuss alternative paradigms that could explain the evolution of the OSCE during the 1990s. Neorealism is quickly dismissed on the ground that the material structure and the power configurations do not match completely the patterns of norm diffusion. Liberal institutionalism would fare better they argue, but it would fail to distinguish the reasons why states would act accordingly to the normative framework developed at the beginning of the 1990s. In the end, they argue that constructivism offers the best explanation of the evolution of the OSCE after the Cold War.

If Flynn and Farrell (1999) were indeed correct, this would undermine the objectives of this project (i.e. using a theoretical starting point to study the evolution of the OSCE after 1990 that is not completely constructivist). However, their discussion is limited by three elements. First, they argue that power matters somehow (though not exactly according to neorealism, cf. Guzzini 1993) but fail to clearly specify why and how it does. Second, while their explanation of how a normative framework was wanted and adopted in theory by the participating in the Charter of Paris is coherent, their emphasis on the post Helsinki-II period does not achieve such level of coherence. The internalization process of norms is taken for granted: they do not specify the means by which this internalization happened nor do they specify alternative explanations to the role of norms. Finally, their argument does not discuss at length the differences between Western European approaches to norms and the post-communist perspectives. They simply

acknowledge that a difference exists, but again do not attempt to systematically study this aspect. In short, by making norms as both the cause (norms as enabler) and the effect (the internalization of norms being the driving force in the development of the European security environment and the OSCE), their model lacks a coherent model of the evolution of the OSCE. While it is clear that for the authors norms matter, it is unclear for the reader as to how and why they matter.

*The socialization effect of the OSCE*

Two authors address the question of the socialization effect of the OSCE (Merlingen and Ostrauskai 2004, 2005; Kelley 2004). Their main objective is to study how the OSCE shapes the behavior of states by providing a framework of reference for norms. They thus argue that the OSCE is a tool for the transmission of liberal and democratic norms in the post-communist region.

Michael Merligen and Rasa Ostrauskai (2005) argue that the OSCE has become "an agency for the promotions of norms centred on human security" (127). The OSCE is thus an institutional structure that socialize countries and actors in targeted countries to the values and norms of the Euro-Atlantic community. They divide the "OSCE's socialization toolkit" (129) into rewards / punishments tools and training / mediation techniques. They argue that the OSCE's main strategy is a philosophy of knowledge creation and transfer (131). In their conclusion, they note that the OSCE has become a socializing agency that relies less on rewards and punishements than on its communicative action and mediation skills (145).

In her analysis of the OSCE, Kelley (2004) tries to understand the influence of European institutions (Council of Europe (CoE), European Union and OSCE) in post-communist countries regarding norms about ethnic minorities. She argues that membership conditionality related to the EU was a driving force, but that normative pressures coming from the OSCE and the CoE also influenced the policymaking of certain post-communist countries (10). In her theoretical framework, she links her work to the socialization literature, but she prefers the term of normative pressures (23). This has the added value, she argues, of including mechanisms such as membership conditionality and other tools that have concrete incentives. Yet, when she refers to the role of the OSCE, she mainly refers to socialization practices. In her conclusion, she notes that conditionality has the most effect, but that normative pressures are a useful complementary tool. Despite some failures of the OSCE socialization mechanisms such as the High Commissionner on National Minorities, the OSCE has had some positive effects, for example in Slovakia. In the end, she makes two important remarks. First, the level of domestic opposition does have an impact on the influence of international organizations. Then, she also notes that her case studies offer proofs of the separate, and linked, influences of both concrete incentives and socialization practices.

*The role of power within the OSCE*

Two authors (Tudyka 2000; Merlingen 2003) use a constructivist framework to understand the role of power within the OSCE. Merlingen (2003) uses a critical constructivist approach to make his argument while Tudyka (2000) outlines the normative structure that binds power within the OSCE.

The article by Tudyka (2000) is, in his own words, an "essay [that] presents preliminary findings and thus rather outlines the feasibility of a study on hegemony" (239). Thus, this work should only be considered as an illustration of the possibility of understanding power through the diffusion of hegemony within the OSCE, not as a demonstration of the way power works within the OSCE. Starting from a realist perspective on hegemony where the OSCE can only work insofar as the hegemon wishes it to work (239), Tudyka then develops a framework where the institutional structure of the OSCE can embed the hegemon into a framework that allows normsetting operations and autonomous policymaking by the organizations (241). Thus, he provides a framework in which both traditional hegemonic power and normsetting behaviour influence the OSCE. In short, he adds another variable to the traditional realist understanding of power within international organizations.

Merligen's work (2003) develops a foucaldian framework to study power relations within the OSCE. His research focuses on the sources and use of power within the OSCE. The foucauldian framework which he uses is centered around the "micro domains of power relations formed and sustained by IGOs" (362). His main objective is to study the techniques of government to gain power and the rationalities of these practices. In short, Merlingen applies the concept of governmentality to the study of the OSCE : "Governmentality thus highlights everyday relations of power extending beyond the central state, microinstitutional relations of power that order societies" (366). He then proceeds to make his argument clearer by analyzing the means and techniques of the OSCE : the long-

term missions and the High Commissionner on National Minorities. In the end, these technologies of the OSCE enable the organization to have a diffuse form of power on countries it attempts to socialize in the Western security community (377).

In the end however, Merligen's framework gives little in term of generalization : "The main 'value added' of such a framework is that it brings into focus the micro-domain of power relations, thereby highlighting what mainline IGO studies, including research on international socialization, fail to thematize." (377). This is not to say that his vision of how the diffusion of power is done at the micro level is wrongly stated, but that the level of analysis he uses does not serve the purpose of this study : to study the interaction between the overall structure of the OSCE and the participating states. Such a conceptualization of power does not help to understand the larger framework.

*The security community dimension of the OSCE*

Another school of analysis, which could be classified as constructivist, is the one centered around security community. Hong (1997) and Adler (1998) illustrate, both theoretically and empirically, this approach.

Both studies originate from the research program launched by Karl Deutsch et al (1957). However, while the work by Hong (1997) is empirically more developed (his main objective is to illustrate the development of the OSCE into a security-community model), the theoretical renewal proposed by Adler and Barnett in their volume on security communities (1998) gives an added value to

Adler's chapter on the OSCE. For this reason, this review concentrates on Adler's work (1998). For a full view of the applicability of the security community model concerning the development of the C/OSCE (until 1995), the work of Ki-Joon Hong (1997) remains essential.

Adler (1998) argues that the creation of a security community within the Euro-Atlantic community has been fostered by institutions such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the OSCE (119). He then proceeds to evaluate the role of the OSCE in the construction of a security community. He highlights seven key elements that the OSCE provides to the making of the Euro-Atlantic security community, among which the development of mutual trust and cooperation and the norms of peaceful resolution of conflicts (132). He then shows how the OSCE frames these particular norms : seminar diplomacy, cooperative security, community building-devices, etc. (132-142). In his conclusion, Adler argues that the OSCE shaped the security community in Europe not by reducing transactions costs, but rather by transforming the practices of the participating states and embedding these practices in a normative framework centred around the concept of cooperative security (149-150).

*Non-constructivst approaches to the study of the OSCE*

While the studies reviewed above showed a clear trend towards using a constructivist framework to study the OSCE, it would be a false representation to put all theory-related research on the OSCE within this constructivist basket. A few authors have tried to shed light on the OSCE using different theoretical tools. Yet, these studies do not have the impact or the explanatory value that the

constructivist literature presents. In fact, only the work of Grussendorf (1998) and Mosser (2001) use a non-constructivist framework. The other studies analyzed here simply mention their theoretical school or make a brief theoretical note.

In this last category, we found the research done by Remacle (1995) and Mottola (1997). Eric Remacle concludes his book on the OSCE and conflict in Europe by highlighting that "We cannot avoid the application of a neorealist framework of analysis to the OSCE in which the interests of the great and middle powers that compose it are reflected in its actions" ( 134)[8]. Yet despite, this final remark, his work contains no other explicit or detailed theoretical elements related to this one.

Mottola (1997) clearly puts her work in theoretical perspectives. However, her objective is to demonstrate the possibility of combining different theoretical frameworks to the study of the OSCE She uses three separate theories : neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and the security community model. She first argues that neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are effective in explaining the security behavior of the OSCE (191). Then, she concludes that non-traditional theories like constructivism are also effective and thus that all three theories are able to provide some explanations and that they are complementary. Her work, however, does not test the relative complementary and does not offer a model to use these theories together. In the end, she simply claims that theory (or more correctly theories) can be used to study the OSCE and that they are useful tools.

[8] Translation by the author : On ne peut éviter d'appliquer à l'OSCE une grille de lecture néoréaliste dans laquelle transparaissent les intérêts et représentations des grandes et moyennes puissances qui la composent (Remacle 1995).

On the other end of this spectrum, we find the studies of Grussendorf (1998) and Mosser (2001) who not only mention theory, but actually engage and embed their work within theoretical frameworks.

Michael Mosser (2001) attempts to understand how power is organized within international organizations. More specifically, he seeks to understand how minor actors within these international organizations engineer influence. In order to do so, he creates a theoretical framework that combines realism and historical institutionalism. By putting forward a sequencing model using two versions of rationalism to explain how influence is engineered, Mosser stresses the importance of the concept of temporally-instrumental norms, that encompasses the notion that norms may be used as tools and do not necessarily need to be constitutive or internalized. When he applies this framework to the OSCE, Mosser distinguishes between the creation phase (1975) and the renegociation phase (after the Cold War). He argues that the N+N (the minor actors within the CSCE process) were most succesful in engineering their influence during the creation phase and that this influence was less important during the renegotiation phase in part due to power politics and realist behaviour by the major powers. Yet, he also finds that the N+N group within the CSCE was able to use norms in order to engineer influence. In this framework, the norms are not generative of new behaviour, but are simply mechanisms used rationally by states (and minor actors) in order to influence the behaviour of other participants. Thus he agrees with Leatherman (2003) on the role of the N+N group within the OSCE, but he disagrees on the role of norms. While Mosser (2001) adopts a logic of

consequentialism related to a rationalist framework, Leatherman (2003) builds her argument on a logic of approprieteness.

Grussendorf (1998) makes a different theoretical contribution. She begins by testing different theoretical perspectives on the OSCE, a task similar to the one done by Mottola (1997). However, not only does she present the theoretical perspective in a better way, but she also engages on the impact of theorizing on the OSCE. After describing the development of the OSCE, Grussendorf (1998) asks a central question: "The main question to be asked at this juncture is how this development can be explained" (14). She then proceeds to test neorealist and neo liberal perspectives on the OSCE in order to assess the impact of theory on practices of multilateralism (14). On the neorealist perspective, she notes that applying this framework to the development of the OSCE provides an interesting starting point (15). "Within the neo-realist framework, the behaviour of the superpowers is paramount in understanding global politics (16). On the other hand, "A neo-liberal interpretation of the development of the C/OSCE stresses the greater role and importance accredited to the European states in as much as their influence in inter-state affairs gained greater impetus within the organization than would otherwise have been possible. " (20). After depicting both theories and their possible application to the development of the OSCE, Grussendorf (1998) then puts these two theories in relation to the practice of multilateralism.

> The above outline of the neo-liberal approach indicates that when the limited neo-realist approach is broadened to include economic structures as well as relations between states, then the role of multilateral organizations, too, can be viewed differently. From this it follows that, while the policy implications of the neo-realist approach point to a pessimistic future for the OSCE, the neo-liberal approach is more optimistic by pointing towards further institutionalization of existing structures. (22)

The work of Grussendorf (1998) thus shows both the potential and the limits of applying neoliberal and neorealist framework to the development of the OSCE. While she focuses on the links between theory and practice, she also highlights the links between theories in developing a relevant analytical framework.

This literature review of relevant theoretical work on the OSCE enabled us to highlight the state of the art of theory-related OSCE studies. First, the constructivist lens is effectively the most frequent starting point. However, within the constructivist literature, authors do not necessarly agree on what constitutes and defines the norms, identity and roles of the OSCE. The OSCE may be a norm-building institution, a norm teacher or a security-community building structure. If we review the non-constructivist literature, we find that it lacks the coherence or the depth of the constructivist literature and that the studies with sufficient causal depth (Kitschelt 2003) are almost inexistant with two major exceptions (Mosser 2001 and Grussendorf 1998). More generally, we have found only thirteen (13) theory-related studies on the OSCE. When compared to the prescriptive and descriptive category of OSCE studies, this third category is almost non-existant. In the second chapter, a detailed analysis of the theoretical and empirical gaps of the OSCE will be made. It is enough for the moment to stress the lack of theory-related on the OSCE, and especially of non-constructivist theory related work.

## Framing the debates on the design and effects of international organizations

The objectives of this section are simple : to review relevant theoretical framework within the studies of international organizations in order to highlight possible ways to theorize about the OSCE. The first part traces the way different theoretical schools caracterize international organizations. Then, some specific theoretical frameworks are analyzed in order to assess both the ways we can study international organizations and the questions we might ask about the roles and impacts of international organizations today.

In this overview, the terms of the debates in the study of international organization are also investigated : what is the nature and the potential consequences of the division between rationalism and constructivism? How can we, broadly, portray this debate? What are the limits and advantages of staging the debate in this particular way? Finally, a brief summary is provided to frame the discussion of chapter two, on the development of a theoretical framework.

### *Theoretical insights on international organizations*

Neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and constructivism all say that international organizations matter. Constructivists argue that international organizations should be treated as autonomous actors in their own right (Strange 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004). On the other end, for neorealists, international organizations matter only to the extent that states use them to strenghten their position. They argue that states are the main actors on the international scene and that international organizations only play a minor and

subordinate role (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994; Schweller 1997). Between those two positions, neoliberal institutionalists put forward a view of international organizations where they are tools for states. They help reduce uncertainty, transactions costs, they serve as bargaining forums for exchanging ideas, preferences and positions (Martin 1992, 1992a; Moravscik 1997; Abbot and Snidal 1998; Fearon 1998; Simmons and Martin 2005). In this rationalist perspective, states rely on international organizations because these institutions present rational benefits to these states. Rooted in exchange theory, the neoliberal institutionalists thus put forward a classic cost / benefits argument (Kehoane 1984; Kahler 1998).

Acknowledging that international organizations do matter in theory across all three major theoretical schools of thought in international organizations is only one part of the puzzle. It is essential to go deeper than the simple statement that international organizations matter to a certain degree. When, how, where and why do they matter ? In what domains do international organizations work the best and why? These practical questions are also addressed in the theoretical literature on international organizations. However, the range and scope of the literature is too vast to be fully analyzed here. Instead, this section will give an overview of recent perspectives on the roles and impacts of international organizations. This overview will serve as the background on which both the debate between rationalism and constructivism is framed and the design of this research paper made.

Starting from the assumptions that international organizations are autonomous actors, constructivists have mostly studied the behaviour and functions of international organizations while the rationalists have taken the task of explaining the design of international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Mosser 2001; Koremenos et al 2001; Barnett and Coleman 2005). Framing the debate between the design and effects of international organizations, even though it simplifies the complexity of international organizations, makes clearer the way academics do research on them. As such these two categories can inform us on what are the main controversies and divisions in the study of international organizations as well as the defining features of these institutions.

In the rationalist literature, one might find that the effects of international organizations are dependent on their design. This path-dependent tendency (Thelen et al 1992; Pierson 2000) enables the authors to posit that their model on the design of institutions has built-in consequences on their development. Recent studies on the design of international institutions have included the project on the rational design of institutions (Koremenos et al 2001), the literature on the design and impacts of treaties (Martin 2005; von Stein 2005), the role of international organizations secretariats and their design (Hamlet 2003), the way states delegate under anarchy (Pollack 1997, 2001; Lake et al 2006) and the specificities of international security institutions (Williams 1997; Duffield 2005).

If one assumes that international organizations are autonomous actors and influence the international and domestic spheres independently of their design, the scope of the work done under this constructivist lens is broader. It includes work

on the pathologies of international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999), the links between democratization and international organizations (Pevehouse 2005; Pevehouse and Mansfield 2006) the socialization effects of international organizations (Johnston 2001; Checkel 2005; Flockhart 2005), the relations between the democratic peace and international organizations (Russett 1998) and work on the domestic impacts of international organizations (Cortell and Davis 1996; Caporaso 1997; Milner 1998).

*A view towards a synthesis or how to build bridges in IR?*

If instead we try to focus on the main debates in international relations theory, one will find a reflection of the previous dichotomy between rationalist and constructivst perspective (Katzenstein et al 1998). However, in recent years, some have argued that the rationalist and constructivist divide should not be exaggerated (Fearon and Wendt 2005) and, following this, calls for theoretical synthesis have been made (Caporaso 1997; Milner 1998; Sterling-Folker 2000; Katzentstein and Okawara 2001; Checkel et al 2003, Fehl 2004; Tierney and Weaver 2006).

Fearon and Wendt (2005) argue that rationalism and constructivism are not theories of international relations, but rather methodological approaches to the study of international politics (52). In this view, they believe that both approaches have substantial areas of agreements between them (52) and that framing the debate in this fashion may limit problem-driven research and facilitate method-driven research (52), which would in turn limit the development of relevant knowledge about international politics (68). They put forward five separate

elements that separate both approaches (54), and higlight the key difference between rationalism seen in the light of methodological individualism and constructivism viewed as methodological holism (57). Yet, they argue in their conclusion that both approaches are in several ways complementary (67) and that the best way to tackle this so-called divide is pragmatically (68) : "In short, we believe the most fruitful framing of 'rationalism vs constructivism' is a pragmatic one, treating them as analytical lenses for looking at social reality".

Starting from these assumptions that both approaches are, and should be treated as, complementary does not mean that they can be merged in a single theory or analytical tool, but rather that this divide hinder our capabilities to understand the realities of international politics. This bridge-building exercice across different theoretical perspectives has been given more attention recently.[9] Checkel and al (2003) then discussed the possible ways one might synthezise across and within this rationalist-constructivist divide. By looking at the institutional development of the EU, they seek a "better integration of the multiple general conceptions of institutions and primarly rational and constructivist (sociological) conceptions." (8). The core of their article consists of a theoretical dialogue between rationalist and constructivist positions in which they set an agenda for the empirical studies of institutions. (8, 17). They put forward four models of theoretical synthesis : competitive testing, additive theory based on complementary domains of application, sequencing theories and subsumption. (19). Competitive testing highlights the techniques of not only testing our theory against the empirical evidence, but also on how it fare compared to other theories.

[9] Zurn and Checkel (2005) note that "Bridge-building has indeed become trendy" (1046)

(20). The domain of application method offers a minimalist version of synthesis. In this model, theories have scope conditions and domains of application that are different and that apply specifically in their own domain, while leaving other domains of application to other theories (21). The sequencing model starts from the assumption that both approaches can be used together to explain a phenomena over time, where one theory explains the first part and the other theory explains its latter evolution (22). Examples of such work include Legro (1996) on conflict formation and Moravscik on preference formation within the EU (1997). Subsumption, or incorporation, seeks to demonstrate that one theory flows from the other and is thus only a special case or a part of this theory. For example, a constructivist view on culture that analyzes institutions and preferences sociologically could argue that rationalist theory derives from these insights and should then be placed as a subcategory of constructivism (23).

Another possible theoretical synthesis derives from the recent work of Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara on analytical eclecticism (2001). The analytical eclecticism perspective seeks to understand empirical realities by refusing parsimony and engaging together the complexity of norms, institutions and power within a single problem-driven perspective (154). In short, "compelling explanations of empirical puzzles can be built through combining realist, liberal and constructivist mode of explanations (178). Yet, despite arguing in favor of a multiplicity of theoretical perspectives, the authors do not specify how this might be done. They do suggest potential bridging points between liberalism and realism, constructivism and rationalism, but they do not provide concrete frameworks for combining these approaches. However, they do provide a

key point : " Instead of approach-driven analysis, we advocate problem-driven approach" (183). This is similar in content to the Fearon and Wendt (2005, 52) argument and to the Checkel *et al* attempt at synthesis (2003, 8 and 17).

Moving from the field of international relations theory in general to the particular domain of international organizations, one finds the same recurring call for synthesis. First, Tierney and Weaver (2006) turn to a theoretical discussion on the possibilities of theoretical synthesis within the field of international organizations. They argue that in the new generation of international organizations studies, theoretical debates and paradigms clashes might lead to a degenerative research program that will lead to a theoretical dead end (3). Their objective is to reconciliate theories of international relations with the real world patterns that need to be understood. Starting again from the need to develop models that offer better empirical analysis (4, 5), Tierney and Weaver (2006) build their project not on the idea of building bridge as an end, but rather "to understand the conditions under which synthesis offer better explanations than we might realize by proceeding independently with our own favored theory" (14). To do so they highlight three central aspects of international organizations : patterns of design and delegation, the organization of IO behavior and the process of IO change (7).[10] Starting from the Checkel et al article (2003), they proprose six models of synthesis : dialogue, competitive theory testing, domain of application, sequencing, subsumption and ideational structures and dynamic sequences. Four of these are taken from Checkel and al (2003), while the other two propose new forms of synthesis. The first one, dialogue, is not a form of synthesis per se, but

[10] This is similar to our classification of the new generation of international organizations studies

rather a preliminary conditions under which proponents of different theoretical perspectives might engage with one another in order to explore the possibility of bridge-building (14-15). The other form of synthesis, ideational structures and dynamic sequencing, is an advanced form of sequencing. Thus, this possibility is similar to the two-step model, but the "steps are repeated in a dynamic process" (21). In short, the influence of both agency and structure is dynamic and is reflected at different period of the international organization life cycle (22). They note however that this final model should follow a strict scientific procedure in order to desentangle the effects of both elements of the dynamic sequencing.

An example of bridge-building can be found in Fehl's article (2004) on the International Criminal Court (ICC). Fehl (2004) seeks to understand the design of the ICC by using both rationalist and constructivist perspectives. In order to do so, she first uses a rationalist approach to explain the design of the ICC and then tries to find if a constructivist approach can solve some of the problems faced by the rationalist approach (359). She concludes her article by demonstrating that both approaches can be taken together in three different ways. First, constructivist explanation can demonstrate the formation of the rational interests that led to the creation of the ICC and thus deepen the argument (384). This is similar in form and content to a sequencing model. Second, both models can offer complementary perspective that are not mutually exclusive in specific domain of application. A rationalist approach highlights the cost of the ICC creation while a constructivist perspective puts forward the legitimacy dimension (384). Finally, a constructivist tool might 'solve' a puzzle that the rationalist perspective cannot explain. In the case of the ICC, the reasons states chose a stronger court without the United

States might be explained in this fashion. This is a reversed two step where a rationalist perspective is then completed by a constructivist explanation (384). Fehl's article thus enables us to see how theoretical synthesis might be done empirically and how they add to our global understanding of an empirical phenomena.

## Conclusion

This chapter had two objectives : to provide a literature review on the OSCE and highlight the need for a theoretical turn in OSCE studies and to discuss potential theoretical framework of analysis to study the OSCE.

In the first section, a classification of the literature on the OSCE was made: descriptive, prescriptive and constructivist studies. This section also highlighted the need for a theoretical turn in the study of the OSCE. Section II offered an overview of the state of theoretical studies on the OSCE and found that most studies have a constructivist lens and that these studies lack in term of both quantity (13 in total) and quality. Section III then provided the tools for a theoretical framework for the study of the design and effects of the OSCE. It gave a general overview of the role of international organizations within international relations theory. The final part of this section then gave an overview of the possibilitiy of theoretical synthesis in international relations in general and some examples of how these synthesis may be used to study international organizations.

The second chapter of this research uses the knowledge provided in this section to establish three elements. First, it highlights the empirical gaps within

the OSCE literature in order to assess what we should study. Then, it draws attention towards the theoretical tools we might use to study the OSCE. Finally, this chapter offers testable hypothesis about the OSCE and a complete theoretical framework to study this hypothesis in a problem-driven fashion. Chapter III will then consist of the solution to the empirical puzzle by distinguishing three phases within the OSCE after the Cold War and defining these phases and their implication using a process-tracing technique (George and Bennett 2005 ).

# Chapter II

## Constructing a theoretical framework

Building on the insights and findings of the previous chapter, this chapter provides the definition of the puzzle concerning the evolution of the OSCE using the gaps found in the literature and proceeds to develop a theoretical framework to solve this puzzle. The empirical solution to this OSCE dilemma is left to the third chapter of this research. In order to develop the necessary elements relevant to the theoretical framework, this chapter is divided in three sections. First, a detailed analysis of the literature review is made. Using the main findings of the previous chapter, this section tries to focus the debate by identifying the main empirical and theoretical gaps within the literature. In short, it asks a simple question: What are the most relevant elements about the OSCE that we do not clearly understand? A second section then turns to framing the question at hand. It focuses on two elements: the precise terms of the puzzle that this study seeks to understand and the hypothesis drawn from this problem. The third section consists of the theoretical framework itself. A preliminary overview puts the model in relations with the current debates within international relations and the field of international organizations. The next part gives the main assumptions underlying this model. The third part explains the conceptual framework in detail, including the definition of the dependent and independent variables used in this study. A final section concludes this chapter by addressing the methodology of this study. It discusses both the overall method used in this project, process-tracing, and the way it is applied to the study of the design of the OSCE.

## Identifying the gaps in the literature

*Empirical gaps*

The literature review made in the previous chapter highlights a number of elements about the OSCE that are either not dealt with or that are left underdeveloped. An initial caveat, however, should be made. Many studies address specific issues within the OSCE, such as the effect of one field mission on the development of a single issue (i.e. the impact of the long-term missions in Georgia on the so-called frozen conflicts). However, reviewing a large portion of the OSCE literature in the first chapter and then stating that what we need is more detailed case-studies and in turn devoting this research project to the analysis of a precise case within a precise geographical and temporal framework would not fulfill the objectives of this paper. This does not mean that case studies on the OSCE activities are not useful, but rather that the focus of this study is towards understanding issues at a broader level.

As such, by looking at the gaps within the OSCE literature, the objective is to understand how we can globally portray the OSCE. For this purpose, three elements stand out. First, too few studies (i) encompass a time frame that spans the whole post-Cold War period and (ii) attempt to connect different elements together. The focus is on specific case studies, not on possible middle-range generalizations. Finally, (iii) a large amount of OSCE studies provide only shallow explanations (Kitschelt 2003). As mentioned in the previous chapter, descriptive and prescriptive analyses of the OSCE form the vast majority of

OSCE studies. Yet, while they are useful to familiarize ourselves on the actual situation and the ongoing debates and trends, they do not help us make causal inferences and they do not address the key issue of why is the OSCE the way it is and the way it will / should be. In short, by adopting a short time frame and a single aspect of the OSCE activities / structure, the majority of the research on the OSCE does not enable us to understand the root causes of the changes within the OSCE after the Cold War.

If we look at the theory-related studies on the OSCE, the time frame problem remains. Some recent studies are interested in looking at the history of the CSCE (Mosser 2001; Thomas 2001; Leatherman 2003) while those which focus on the post-Cold War period do not offer a full view of the period after the Istanbul Summit in 1999 (Remacle 1995; Mottola 1997; Grussendorf 1998; Adler 1998; Flynn and Farrell 1999; Tudyka 2000; Mosser 2001;). Concerning the scope of these studies, they do offer a broader perspective on the OSCE. Yet, if we turn at the third gap we identified in the literature, we find that the explanations offered usually highlight traditional constructivist analytical tools (norms, security community, identity transformation) and neglect the power dimension and the strategic calculations of participating states.

*Theoretical gaps*

As noted above and in chapter I, much of the theoretically oriented research on the OSCE uses a constructivist framework. The structure and the design of the OSCE effectively seem to be an easy case for constructivist analysis: the consensus rule seems to enable each actor to influence the OSCE and power

thus plays a less central role while the focus is on collective identity, social and normative persuasion, all elements largely documented in the constructivist literature in general (Adler 1997, Pouliot 2001); the decisions and documents of the OSCE reflect its focus on the development of liberal democratic norms, another constructivist concern; and the decentralized structure of the OSCE, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the long-term missions seem to shape the OSCE's role as a forum for the development and internalization of norms rather than as a tool for powerful states. These are defined, amongst other, by the concept of seminar diplomacy (Adler 1998) or knowledge creation and transfer (Merlingen and Ostraukai 2005).

Recent studies have however illustrated that norms may be studied from a plurality of perspective. It should not be taken for granted that what seems to be a fit between constructivist theory and empirical data is necessarily what it appears at first sight: potential illusions and pitfalls created by common sense should be carefully taken into considerations (Collier 1996). Thus, there is a need to use new or different theoretical perspectives in order to gain a better understanding of the empirical reality within the OSCE and the dynamics and impacts of norms.

## Framing the debate

*The evolution of the OSCE: a puzzle*

The transformation and the evolution of the OSCE between 1990 and 2006 still remains a puzzle to the academic community. Some studies help understand part of this evolution, but the overall framework of this evolution and the

consequences it had are left mostly unanswered. Descriptive studies of the OSCE show the consequences of particular events of decisions, but they do not offer a broad picture of this institutionalization process. Prescriptive studies highlight possible ways of transforming the OSCE, but they do not provide the reasons why the OSCE has institutionalized in this particular design and what are the effects of this institutional design. Constructivist-oriented studies on the OSCE suggest the importance of the normative framework within the OSCE, yet these studies mostly look at the external effects of the norms and not on the effects of norms on the institutional design of the OSCE. Other theory-driven work on the OSCE showed the importance of the participating states' interests, but focused on the effects this had on the OSCE behaviour and actions vis-à-vis other states or institutions. They also overlook the effects this had on the institutional design of the OSCE.

In short, this study seeks to answer the following empirical questions: Which factors, and how, influenced and shaped the transformation of the OSCE after the Cold War? What are the impacts of this specific process of transformation on the development of the OSCE today?

This particular question makes two important attempts to fill the empirical and theoretical gaps within the OSCE literature. First, it attempts to solve the time frame problem by looking at the entire period after the Cold War (1990-2006), from the euphoria of 1990 to the actual crisis, encompassing the main institutionalization process between these two periods. Secondly, it attempts to fill the gap on the internal effects of both norms and participating states' interests. It

does so by not only looking at the way norms and national interests affects the way the OSCE interacts with other states, institutions or in conflict situation, but by also looking at the effects this had on the internal behaviour of the OSCE. By integrating the internal and external effects of both normative pressures and national interests, this question derives from an historical institutionalist background, where the design had important and critical impacts on the actions and behaviour of the organization between 1990 and 2006. It attempts to show that to analyze the effects of the OSCE after the Cold War on security issues in Europe, it is essential to study its redesign and its transformation from an open discussion forum through an almost full-fledged international organization.

*Main Arguments*

This project first argues that the transformation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has been mostly influenced by the liberal democratic norms present in the Western security community. However, these norms were not integrated as part of logic of appropriateness, and thus not internalized by the East European and post-Soviet countries. Instead, it is the manipulative, strategic and rational use of these norms – through the concept of rhetorical action - that accounts for the way the OSCE has redesigned itself.

The second argument that this study advances is that this particular process of institutionalization led inevitably – in a path-dependent process – to the actual crisis and the stalemate of this organization, the main consequence of its internal evolution that we see today.

Thus, the deliberate and strategic use of the liberal democratic norms by the different participating states within the OSCE not only shaped its institutionalization process, but it also had the consequence of recreating new dividing lines within this organization and thus provide the background for the ongoing crisis within the OSCE.

*Alternative explanations*

Not only does this approach proposes a theoretically informed way of understanding the transformation of the OSCE after the Cold war, it also fares better than other theoretical explanations. First, the founding principles of the OSCE rest on normative grounds. This implies that a transactional approach based on liberal—institutionalist theory would fail to take into consideration the normative aspect of the OSCE. It would be able to provide a comprehensive analysis of the actual state of the OSCE, namely the clash of participating states' interests that shape the ongoing crisis, but would have difficulty, especially in the context of the alphabet soup of regional security institutions in Europe, to explain the initial redesign of the OSCE. In contrast, a constructivist approach would provide relevant explanations on the redesign of the OSCE, namely on the basis of common values and integrated –internalized liberal democratic norms. Yet, if these norms and values were internalized, the state of the OSCE in 2006 would be much brighter and an institutional crisis would not jeopardize the organization. As such, both perspectives offer partial explanations of the puzzle, but do not offer a complete picture of this evolution. By using a synthesis model, the arguments made in this study present a more detailed and complete view of the OSCE between 1990 and 2006.

## The theoretical model

In order to illustrate the transformation and evolution of the OSCE after the Cold War and provide the empirical evidence to the two main arguments this project makes, this section develops the theoretical model used in this analysis. The first part begins by locating the model within the international organizations and international relations theory literature. The second part shows the main assumptions of the model and its principal mechanisms. The final section provides the details of this conceptual framework by highlighting the dependent and independent variables and discussing the working logic of this model.

*On international relations theory*

This project is first related to international relations theory via its attempt to produce a synthesis across constructivist and liberal-institutionalist theories. Drawing from the literature review made in the previous chapter, the model used here is akin to the sequencing attempts at synthesis. To be consistent with the argument made in this research, the model starts with rationalist assumptions about the participating states' interests. However, to be accurate, this model then shows the role of norms and their evolution with the OSCE environment in order to deepen the argument. These two elements are linked in a two step sequence (Legro 1997). However, this process is reversed in the sense that it begins with a rationalist explanation of national interests' formation and deepens the explanation by looking at the construction of the organizations through the interactions of the participating states within a constitutive liberal democratic

environment. This second step thus looks at the sociology of group interactions within this organization.

Yet, it also rejects the notion that these two steps are distinct and occupy specific and different time frames. While they can be analytically separated to present better explanations, they should be seen in a complex process. As such, this model also follows the lead of Tierney and Weaver (2006) on the 6th possibility of synthesis: dynamic sequencing. These authors are however vague on the application of such process in empirical terms. To resolve this indeterminacy, the model used here adopts a path-dependent outcome. This has the added value of parsimony (the dynamic part of sequencing is always linked to the same concept) and it can be easily replicated (the concept remains the same throughout the evolution of the OSCE and thus can be analyzed at different periods). To be sure, however, path dependency does not simply means that past matters, if "this concept has to mean anything, it means that the cost of going into another direction is increasingly high" (Levy 98).[11] Drawing from this concept, it is possible to see that the initial preferences of the participating states are reinforced when they interact within the liberal democratic environment.

This model distinguishes, analytically, between national interests' formation, states' interactions and path-dependent outcomes. Epistemologically,

[11] If we look at the OSCE today, one might think that path-dependency theory means that the OSCE's crisis is structural and thus cannot be resolved. However, one might also argue that path dependency leaves some place to agency and that political actors can change the direction of the OSCE, although at a high cost. This is usually done in the context of critical junctures, see on this matter and for a variation on the concept of path dependency (the notion of path contingency), Johnson 2001

this model rather applies a dynamic sequencing model of international relations theories synthesis between rationalist and constructivist theoretical models.

*On international organizations literature*

While the focus of this study is on the how states (re) designed the OSCE and how the OSCE evolved after the Cold War, it also addresses issues found in current debates on the roles and effects of international organizations. This study deals with issues such as compliance, international socialization and conditionality.

Starting with the recent developments on the socialization effect of international organizations, this study makes a modest proposal. Drawing from the categorization made by Risse et al (1999) on the different level of socialization (on a scale ranging from the rejection of norms to its complete internalization), the socialization within the OSCE is found between these two extremes. Norms are not rejected by states, but they are not internalized: they are part of a rational strategy and form part of the toolkit of states to advance their own interests. This assumption is driven by recent findings on both the OSCE (Kelley 2004) and the enlargement of the EU and NATO (Schimmelfennig 2005) as well as the concluding remarks made by Johnston in the special issue of *International Organization* on "Socialization in Europe" (2005). It also highlights some hypothesis made by Zurn and Checkel in the final article of this special issue (2005).

Related to the socialization literature, although not directly associated with this project, the literature on conditionality (Kelley 2004) could benefit from this model. In short, by demonstrating that the effect of norms is limited and cannot be entirely successful to socialize states within the liberal democratic environment, at least in Europe, this project highlights the potential importance of conditionality and material incentives.

Finally, this study also illustrates the motivations behind compliance and the consequences of compliance and non compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Baldwin 1999; Pape 1998) regarding the rules and decisions taken by international organizations. This project thus puts in relation the normative conditions for compliance with the participating states' main interests and attempts to analyze the key elements of this relationship.

*The origin and assumptions of the model*

The model designed here to explain the evolution and transformation of the OSCE after the Cold War derives from recent sociological imports into the domain of international relations theory. This section first introduces the work of Erving Goffman and the way his analytical work was used in international relations. Another paragraph illustrates the way Frank Schimmelfenning first adapted the model to explain the successive enlargements of NATO and the EU. A final note is made to characterize the way this model can be adapted to the study of international organizations' change.

What many titled the constructivist turn in international relations theory (Checkel 1998, Adler 1997, Pouliot 2004) referred to a sociological turn in which the main actors on the international scene, states, are not treated as unitary actors with fixed preferences and identities, but rather as socially constructed (Wendt 1992). Yet, this sociological turn does not necessarily involve a constructivist turn (Schimmelfenning 2001).

Recently, Frank Schimmelfennig (2002, 423) used Erving Goffman theory of dramaturgical action to study aspects of international relations: "This theory conceptualizes actors in a cultural environment as performers engaged in manipulative presentations of self and framing who are, at the same time, constrained by the script and consistency requirement of their roles".

While Goffman's work is diverse and complex and branches into several directions, it is his theorization of how actors play the game in everyday life that attracted recent interest from IR theorists.

This theory of dramaturgical action is an attempt to explain the behaviours of actors in a particular mediated game. Within a defined set of rules, actors interact with other actors using the framing and shaming techniques. These two processes refer to the way actors use the rules of the game to advance their own interests and to influence the other actors in the game. The first process, framing refers to the attempt by an actor or a group of actors to impose a particular vision or representation of an event by framing-highlighting the way to which the event is referred to. The framing process also guides us towards to notion of a struggle

between competing visions of the event and competing attempts to frame an event differently. In the vocabulary of the scene used by Goffmann, the actors thus try to produce a script for a particular event and frame the event within this particular script and represent themselves as part of the script. The shaming process consists of embarrassing other actors by forcing them to either lose face or to play within the framed script and to represent themselves either out of character or within the script even if this frame of reference is not their preferred choice. These techniques can be understood as ways of representing an actor within a scene (or community) and the way actors frame the scene in order for their interests be maximized. In short, they may strategically use these frames of reference to shame other actors who do not play within the script and thus constrain them in the script and force upon them a role which they are unwilling to take, but must do so in order to stay within the scene (or the community). Taken together these two techniques define the manipulative scheme of the relations between the actors within the rule-bounded environment.

By bringing Goffman social theory on the strategic views of norms into the domain of international relations theory, Schimmelfennig puts his research in relation to the debate between rationalism and constructivism. He presents Goffman's insights as a possibility of synthesizing between these two approaches.

In order to do so, Schimmelfennig (2003, 167) proposes a sequencing model of synthesis: "The synthetic institutionalist approach to the study of the EU that I develop in this section develops on the rationalist assumptions of fixed

preferences and the constructivist emphasis on the relevance of a cultural environment of state action."

Translated in the domain of international relations, this model starts with the rational base of fixed preferences where actors use the rule-bounded environment to manipulate (via the two processes of shaming and framing defined by Goffman) and incorporate the constructivist emphasis on the role of norms and social constructs. Thus, actors within the international community use and manipulate the norms present within the community in order to promote and advance their own (fixed) interests. Schimmelfennig (2003, 161) offers a synthesis of this model:

> To be sure, this synthesis comes down heavily on the side of rationalism. Institutions constrain the choices and behaviors of self interested actors but do not constitute their identity and interests. Actors follow a logic of consequentialism and do not necessarily learn or internalize new preferences as a result of their interaction.

In order to illustrate the validity of this model, Schimmelfennig (2003) applies different variations of the core model to the enlargement of two regional international institutions: the EU and NATO. His objective is to explain the process of enlargement and the puzzle of enlargement. In short, while it is clear that the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe had good reasons to join the club of the EU and NATO, it is harder to understand the interests of the Western European countries to accept these countries as full members of the EU and NATO club. Schimmelfennig argues that the key to the puzzle lies within the interactions between states' desire to maximize their interests and the impacts of the liberal-democratic norms that are present in the international environment. In short, while a rationalist explanation can account for the desire of the Eastern

European countries to join the EU and NATO, it is necessary to take into consideration the normative element to understand the reasons why the West gave in and enlarged the EU and NATO. Schimmelfennig (2003) argues that it is the pressures made by the Eastern European states using as leverage the liberal democratic norms that forced the enlargement. By framing the debate not as an economic one but rather as one to reunite Europe and to enlarge the liberal democratic community and by shaming the Western European countries that were unwilling to enlarge using the normative argument, the Eastern European states were able to impose these successive enlargements.

*Concerning the design of international organizations*

This model however does not specifically address the creation of these institutions, the EU and NATO, and the outcomes of these successive enlargements. On the one hand, the last point, outcomes, is in fact addressed: since Schimmelfenning tries to explain why there was actually an enlargement, the outcome is the actual enlargement. This however has limits. It looks only at the immediate and most obvious outcome. The first element, the design of these institutions, is not addressed by Schimmelfenning (2003). This can be explained by the fact that since the factors enabling enlargements are to be found in the process of shaming and framing by particular states, an inside look at how institutional design helped or hindered this process is not necessary. This is somewhat problematic. As a first attempt at theorizing Goffmann in IR, Schimmelfenning's case studies of EU and NATO are relevant. But at the same time, reducing the causal explanation of these enlargements to a rational use of norms limits the capacity to go beyond the short term outcome.

A logical extension of this rationalist framework embedded in a normative environment would be a complementary view on the design of institutions. In turn, by incorporating a conceptual model on the design of international organizations, the short-term focus on the immediate outcomes is eliminated. This is explained by the fact that by looking at the design, it is possible to study a range of consequences, starting from the enlargement and moving forward to questions of cooperation, issues addressed and increasing or decreasing impact and relevance of the organization. However, for theoretical coherence, some guidelines must be introduced in order to address both the design and the range of possible consequences.

According to Schimmefelnning (2002, 2003), his theory applies a sequencing model in which states are rational actors pursuing the maximization of their interests but are embedded in a normative social environment which acts as a tool or as a set of constraints regarding these national interests. Thus to be consistent with this approach, a rationalist model of the design of international organizations should be used.

Transforming this initial model first means to change the objective of the model from the study of external outcomes to the study of internal processes. Making this analytical distinction does not change the model itself, only its direction. The new direction of the model is the internal mechanism and transformation of the international organization. The focus is on the way the organization modifies itself in relation to the process of framing and shaming and

not only on the way these two processes shape the external environment. In other words, it introduces an intermediary step between the formation of states' interests and the external impact of the rational use of norms by these states. It opens the black box of international organizations by studying the impacts at different stages of this rational use of norms.

However, adapting the model to study the internal behaviour does not mean that the external outcomes are not important. This adaptation simply deepens the explanation of international organizations' change. The outcome phase remains important to look at, but primarily as a consequence of the internal transformation of the organization. As such, the external outcome becomes dependent on the internal transformation. Analytically, this means adding a path-dependent outcome to link these two issues of internal change and external outcome : the repeated interactions of members states within the organization using the framing and shaming techniques reinforces the importance of these techniques on the behaviour of states. The more states use framing and shaming, the more difficult it is for states to adopt new strategies of interaction. The more framing and shaming is used, the more it produces two different outcomes: the acceptation of the liberal democratic norms within the organization or the growing tensions within the organization because of the conflictual vision concerning liberal democratic norms. Drawing from the degree of acceptation of conflict, it is possible to explain and analyze the outcomes on the organization relevance and importance, ranging from full cooperation to total paralysis. Thus, the outcome depends on the path used by members' states to produce change within the organization.

To adapt Schimmelfennig's framework to the study of international organizations' change, two aspects must be developed. First, the model should analyze the internal behaviour of states within the international organization and focus on the different stages of the transformation process and not focus solely on immediate outcomes. In turn, this helps to understand the actual evolution at each stage of its development and to analyze the range of outcomes and possibilities that exist within the organization at different moments of its existence. Secondly, the model can be completed by a path dependency factor. While the sequencing part helps explain the stages of the transformation, the path dependent part helps understand its outcome. It thus makes the analytical connection between the step by step transformation and the actual outcome within the organization.

## Presentation of the theoretical framework

The theoretical model used to understand the transformation of the OSCE after the Cold War can be seen through three related elements: stages of development, mechanisms and variables.

The model can be divided in three stages, the design phase, the development phase and the outcome phase. In the first phase, members' states attempt to create an organization that fits with their rational interests and thus a bargaining process is involved amongst member's states. In the second phase, actors attempt to maximize their interests within the institutions by transforming the institution. In the final stage, the impacts of the members' states actions within

the organization during the design and development phases are assessed and analyzed.

The independent variable is thus the behaviours of the members' states and the dependent variable is the change within the organization. The normative environment serves as an intervening variable to understand the way the behaviour of members' states is shaped.

The two mechanisms that states use to influence the direction of the organization and to maximize their interests are the process of framing and shaming in which states uses the normative environment in order to constrain other actors in accepting the desired change or transformation. Thus, these mechanisms are the key elements that show the influence of the independent variables on the change within the organization. A third mechanism comes into play to understand the outcome phase, the path dependency process which also makes the link between the independent and dependent variables.

## Methodology

This section deals with the methodological issues involved in this study. First, it explains the choice of the OSCE as the case study for this theoretical model. The technique employed, process-tracing, is then drawn for this case study. The first part deals with the event selection and the second part deals with how each sub case is studied in the same way to understand the process of transformation using the theoretical model outlined above.

*Case selection*

In order to test the validity of this theoretical framework, this study analyzes the transformation of the OSCE after the Cold War. The case study of the OSCE corresponds to a most-likely case of theory-testing (George and Bennett 2005, 75). It is thus a good starting point to assess the preliminary validity of the model. First, the OSCE has been one of the international organizations in Europe that has adapted the most since the end of the Cold War. It has done so in part because its members are from Vancouver to Vladivostok, including all the post-communist countries of the former Soviet bloc are members. The diversity of political regime in the OSCE area sets the tone for a plurality of conception concerning the role of norms, the relevance of the OSCE and definition of European security. Thus, the OSCE is an ideal place to study the emergence, development and impacts of liberal democratic norms in the post-communist transformations. Secondly, the OSCE is part of the densest network of social interactions, the European political arena[12] The OSCE has all the sufficient conditions to be evaluated within this model and provides us with an analysis of its transformation: massive transformation after 1990, different stages of change, presence of liberal democratic countries, democratizing countries, and non-liberal democratic countries and a dense network of social interactions.

*Process tracing*

Process tracing is defined as a "method [that] attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an

[12] This argument is similar to the one used by Checkel et al (2005) in their study of international socialization

independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett 2005). As such, the objective is to identify the repertoire of causal paths that link these set of variables together. In order to do so, each step of the process must be consistent with the hypothesis (George and Bennett 2005). For this study, an analytic explanation will be made using five events that occurred within the OSCE between 1990 and 2005 in order to assess the validity of the model. By selecting five distinct events, it is thus possible to understand the three stages of the model (design, transformation and outcomes) and to provide with enough evidence as to validate our hypothesis.

The five events that have been selected are as follow. For the design phase of the model, the Second Helsinki Summit in 1992 will be analyzed. This summit (that is a conference at the head of state level) marks the beginning of the transformation of the OSCE and offers an interesting picture of the OSCE before its redesign. For the second phase of the model, two events will be analyzed. First, the security model process of Lisbon between 1994 and 1996 will be analyzed to evaluate the first steps of this transformation. The second event will be the negotiations leading up to and the Istanbul Summit of 1999. This event marks the end of the transformation process and the beginning of the third stage. It is also the last summit of the OSCE. Two events will be used to analyze the ongoing crisis, the outcome phase: the budget crisis between 2003 and 2005 and the panel of eminent persons on strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE, 2004-2006.

| Phase | | Events | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stage I: Design | | Charter of Paris 1990 | Helsinki-II 1992 | |
| Stage II: Development | | Security Model 1994-1996 | Istanbul Summit 1999 | |
| Stage III: Outcomes | | Budget crisis 2001-2006 | Panel of eminent persons 2004-2006 | |

Each case will be drawn in exactly the same way in order to measure the impacts of the independent and intervening variables as well as providing the background for an understanding of the causal mechanisms.

First, a summary of the event will be sketched. The next part will provide the necessary theoretical information concerning the stage, the variables and the expected logic of the event. The third section will consist of the explanation of the members' states behaviour (independent variable), the role of the liberal democratic environment (intervening variable) and the consequences on the OSCE (dependent variable). The final section gives a summary of the key elements and assess the relationship between the sub case and the theoretical model.

## Chapter III

## Transforming the OSCE- Empirical Evidence[13]

The objectives of this chapter are to test the theoretical framework described in the previous chapter and, in the concluding section, to assess its merits and limits and push the research agenda in new directions. In order to do so, this chapter is divided in four sections. The first three sections mirror the three stages defined in the model: design, development and outcomes phases, while the last one discusses the way forward.

Five distinct events or chain of events will be analyzed to provide the empirical evidence. For the design phase, the period between 1990 and 1992, and most importantly the Charter of Paris in 1990 and the Second Helsinki Summit in 1992, will serve as the main analytical element. For the development phase, the construction of the Security Model leading to the Istanbul Summit and the Charter for European Security will be studied. As such, this phase will look at the period between 1994, after the Budapest Summit, and 1999, the last OSCE Summit in Istanbul. Again, two central events will be the focus of this section: the Lisbon Summit, 1996, and Istanbul Summit. The third and final stage will be studied from a different angle. Since there have been no OSCE summits after 1999, the outcomes of the first two stages will be studied using two ongoing debates within the OSCE. The first one is the budget crisis that has plagued the organization since 2001. The second one is the debate on new reforms within the OSCE after

[13] A detailed list of OSCE archive documents used in this study is available from the author, the technical nature and the large amount of cited documents made it hard to include the references in text for this article

the Istanbul Summit, but the focus will be on the debates leading to and following the panel of eminent persons on strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE.

The last section puts these three elements in a comparative perspective for two purposes: give a broad view of the way the OSCE was transformed during the 1990s and provide a point of departure for new research on the role of states and norms within international organizations.

**From the Charter of Paris to Helsinki-II: The creation of a new normative environment**

Two documents have marked the end of the Cold War period: the OSCE's Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990 and, before that, the London Declaration by NATO stating that the members of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union are not adversaries anymore. The Charter of Paris reiterated the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and, under the heading "A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity", paved the way for the development of a liberal democratic environment in Europe, broadly defined. As such, two objectives were behind this Charter. The first was the necessity to state and affirm that a new era had begun and that the principles of the Final Act were still relevant in this new environment. In short, the Charter laid the normative foundations of this new security landscape. The second objective was to start the (re) design of the OSCE in order to account for the new realities of the post-Cold War era and to develop new structures that would be able to preserve the foundations of this new liberal order. Thus, a Secretariat was established in Prague to assist the Council of Senior Officials (CSO) in the administrative duties and to help set a plan for the review

of the OSCE structures, mandates and activities that would take place two years after in Helsinki. In the same vein, two new institutions were created to assure that the normative foundations of this new environment would be preserved. The Office for Free Elections (Warsaw, renamed Office for democratic institutions and human rights, ODIHR) and the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC, Vienna) were established to help with the democratization process following the end of the Cold War and to assist in monitoring potential conflict situations and to prevent those situations.

Two years after, the Helsinki Summit began in an entirely different setting. While the events of 1989-1990 seemed to pave the way for an era of democracy, peace and unity, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the outbreak of war in the Balkans and new conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the post-soviet countries reminded the OSCE's participating states that much effort was still needed to create a peaceful European environment. Three elements stand out of this Summit and the document appropriately named *The challenge of changes*: the continued process of institutionalization, the responses to the new security environment and the normative foundations of the OSCE. (Heraclides 1993; Bloed 1994)

First, Helsinki-II continued the development of new structures and activities that started with the Charter of Paris. The final decisions expanded the mandates of the OFE and renamed it ODIHR and the CPC was also given new functions, notably concerning the Peaceful Settlements of Disputes. The decision-making body, the CSO, also saw its role increased. Yet, it is the creation of the

High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) that seems to be the central element of this institutionalization process. The HCNM is an instrument of conflict prevention and helps to diffuse and de-escalate ethnic tensions and serves as an early-warning procedure (Heraclides 1993; Bloed 1994).

Secondly, Helsinki-II confirmed the impression of a gap between the OSCE's development and the chain of events that unfolded rapidly in Europe. As such, the OSCE was clearly reflecting the day-to-day evolution of the security environment in Europe. While the Charter of Paris is based on an optimistic view of the future, "Challenge of changes" is marked with a much more pessimistic view. The attempt to create a peacekeeping force within the structure of the OSCE and the position of many participating states that wanted to focus on the politico-military dimension of the Final Act also showed the way the OSCE reacted to the European conflicts. The rapid pace of the political pressures and new emerging threats in Europe thus clearly limited the ability of the OSCE to adapt and to fulfill the expectations of its incomplete (re) design. Related to this problem was the necessity to deal with other security forums such as NATO that also placed the newly designed OSCE institution in competition with other structures and thus limited the efficiency of the institutionalization process.

Finally, it is possible to understand the process of institutionalization that took place in 1992 as a way to refocus the European security environment towards the Helsinki-principles.

**Reforming the OSCE: The evolution of the Security Model and the Istanbul Summit**

In order to respond to the ongoing chain of events in Europe[14] and also to implement structural reforms within the OSCE to clarify its roles, functions and objectives, the Organization changed its name in 1995 from the CSCE to the OSCE. As part of these structural reforms, the participating states agreed on defining a new organizational model for the OSCE. Thus started in 1994 the Security Model Committee, which objective was to analyze the potential of the OSCE in the European security architecture and to propose new ways for the OSCE to adapt and work in this new security environment. Yet, participating states themselves differed on what they wanted the OSCE to achieve. On the one hand, some states, including the Russian Federation, wanted to transform the OSCE as a fully-fledged legal international organization and to make it the central pillar of European security. On the other hand, the United States did not find the organization to be fully relevant and wanted to keep the OSCE low-profile and go with NATO as the central institution in Europe. In the middle, the European Union argued for a balanced approach where the OSCE should find a niche within the security field, namely as a promoter of liberal democratic norms (Ghébali 1996; Plate 1999).

The way the discussions on this new model appeared highlights the process of rhetorical action. At the first meeting of the subcommittee, the Russian Federation produced a complete draft of what it wanted the Security Model to be.

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[14] The successive disintegrations of the USSR and Yugoslavia and the conflicts that emerged from these disintegrations are considered by most OSCE analysts to have had a critical importance (especially the Balkans war, the Kosovo crisis and the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space) ( Ghébali 1996 ; Kemp 2001)

The Russian Federation promoted its ideas by relating them to the Helsinki norms. In short, the Russian Federation attempted to frame the debates as one about the future of democracy and stability in Europe. Throughout the two years discussion of the committee, this was the approach of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states: to promote their security interests by framing the debate and shaming the Western members in acquiescing to their demands. This strategy however did not fully work. First, the United States were fully opposed to an increase of mandate and power of the OSCE while some Europeans countries (with France leading) were willing to accept a legal framework for the OSCE, but not much more. The framing and shaming strategies had some, albeit limited, success in that at the Lisbon Summit of 1996 the Security Model document was adopted, though with only minor structural reforms and no new legal status for the organization. In short, while the security situation had dramatically changed since 1990 and 1992, the Security Model did little to provide a relevant working platform for the OSCE (Schneider 1998).

The compromise achieved in Lisbon was only temporary and did not satisfy any states. In response to what many post-Soviet states perceived as an imbalance between the three dimensions, with a focus on the human dimension, these states demanded that the OSCE should focus on all three dimensions (human, politico-military and economic) equally. In order to promote these ideas, the post-Soviet countries attempted to shame the Western countries by affirming that the imbalances present within the organization did not foster democratization and the implementation of liberal democratic norms in their countries. These repeated attempts started in 1997 and led to a renewed attempt by the OSCE to

renegotiate its functions and roles. Yet this time, the European Union and the United States also attempted to frame the debate as one concerning the role of the Russian Federation in its near neighborhood. Their main argument is that the role of the Russian Federation in the so-called frozen conflicts was clearly negative and that in order to respect the Helsinki principles; Russia should remove its troops from the region, especially Georgia.

In short, between 1997 and 1999, a new round of negotiations started that involved two sides attempting to frame the debates in their own favorable terms and to shame the other in acquiescing to their demands. This, again, resulted in a new document at the Istanbul Summit of 1999, the Charter for European Security. This document was seen as a limited (Ghébali 2001) success as it forced the Russian Federation to dismantle most of its military bases in Georgia in the following years, yet the document does not contain new ideas for the transformation of the OSCE and only reiterates what had been done in Lisbon.

**From stagnation to open crisis – The politics of reform within the OSCE**

The repeated framing and shaming struggles within the OSCE eventually led to unintended consequences that, related to our theoretical framework, can be linked to a path dependency process. In short, after the Istanbul Summit, the organization was not able to push through some much needed reforms and due to the differences of interests between the participating states, a period of stagnation started and the OSCE could not manage efficiently its activities. The stagnation process can be illustrated in the ongoing budget debates of the organization in

which the absence of consensus within the participating states eventually led, in 2004 and 2005, to a budget being adopted at the last minute, almost stopping in 2005 the activities of the OSCE, except for the administrative tasks and long term missions (Ghébali 2002; 2005).

The crisis process can be seen in light of the repeated struggles as the failed reform attempts, combined with the repeated framing and shaming games, led to an open-crisis within the OSCE. This crisis can be seen in two steps. The firs element can be located in the Moscow Declaration of July 3, 2004 and repeated in the Astana Appeal of September 15, 2004 made by the Russian Federation and some CIS countries in which they denounced the imbalances of the organization and mention clearly that the OSCE will lose its interests and its relevance if no important reform is done (Bloed 2004; Barry 2004). The answer to this was the creation of a panel of eminent persons on strengthening the OSCE launched in 2005. Their recommendations made public in June 2005 still highlight the gaps between the different blocs[15] within the organization and the techniques used by these blocs to promote their interests (Vandemoortele 2006).

It is possible to see that the repeated attempts at framing and shaming the roles and functions of the OSCE by the various participating states, especially the European Union and, subsequently the Russian Federation, hindered and limited the institutionalization of the OSCE. This reflects the hypothesis on the impacts of rhetorical action in the case where norms are not internalized and are use to manipulate: an (almost) total paralysis.

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[15] Bloed (2004) argues that the CIS countries and the Western states of the OSCE are drawing up new lines and forming blocs that are similar to the former East-West divide.

## The way forward

In the end, it is possible to single out other factors that influenced the transformation of the OSCE such as the distribution of power, the domestic politics of the participating states or the division of labor between the different security organizations in Europe. However, these factors can be embedded in the broader theoretical model used here. In short, the name of the game is rhetorical action under a strategic context: the participating states did everything they can (but mostly framing and shaming tactics) to promote their security interests by manipulating the liberal democratic norms that formed the core of the OSCE and of the Helsinki principles. The process of transformation of the OSCE can be seen as a challenge for the spread of democracy as democratic norms were not fully internalized by all participating states, but instead merely used as part of a logic of consequentiality. Further research on the relationship between international organizations, security and democracy is thus needed to see if the OSCE is an exception or the tip of the iceberg. (Epstein 2005; Gheciu 2005; Reiter 2001)

## Conclusion

Using the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a case study, this project presented a model for understanding both the institutional design and the subsequent transformations of international organizations (IGOs). This model derives from a body of literature on the strategic manipulation of norms most recently exemplified by the work of Frank Schimmelfenning. By presenting a model that takes into account the different phases of the life cycle of an IGO, this paper argues that the key point to our understanding of IGOs lies in the struggle for power and influence that is reflected in the processes of shaming and framing, under the notion of rhetorical action, by members states. In the case of the OSCE, different conceptions of the rules and principles of the Helsinki Final Act led the participating states in rhetorical arguments that culminated in what, following a path dependent process, can be labelled as unintended consequences, namely the actual political crisis and stalemate within the organization. Although this model more clearly applies to security institutions and gives us a detailed understanding of their internal mechanisms, use of this model could also provide with better knowledge of non-security related institutions where a consensus does not exist on the normative foundations within the organization.

Chapter I provided a literature review that focused both on studies done on the OSCE and, more broadly, on theories of international organizations. Two elements clearly stood out. First, the literature on the OSCE has given little

attention to theoretical debates, instead concentrating on analysis that described what the OSCE is or attempted to discuss what it should be. The volume of descriptive research gives us a better factual understanding of the OSCE, but does not enable us to understand the underlying causes of the state of the OSCE and its many transformations following the end of the Cold War. Turning to the few studies that addressed the OSCE on theoretical grounds, I found that the debates are dominated by a strong constructivist premise.

Chapter II made explicit the elements found in the literature review and asked several questions on what we know about the OSCE and what we should try to know. This was followed by the presentation of the main puzzle through an evaluation of the gaps in the literature. In short, three main gaps exist in the theoretical literature on the OSCE : a time frame that encompasses the whole period since the end of the Cold War (1990-2006), a specific analysis on the internal impacts of the normative basis of the OSCE (since most of the constructivist studies deal with the external impacts of the OSCE norms and do not render explicit their claims about the origins of these norms) and a focus on the dimension of power within the organization (since most research focused on normative aspects and assumed that power does not play a significant role in an IGO that works within a consensus framework of decision-making). The puzzle is a simple one. If the CSCE, as many studies have recently argued (Thomas 2001), played a key role in the demise of communism and if its role was essential to navigate the transition to a post-Cold War period, why has the OSCE failed to live up to its potential after 1995?

The remainder of Chapter II was used to discuss the main hypothesis, its operationalization and the model used to make the demonstration. It is argued that the deliberate and strategic manipulation of the liberal democratic norms by the different participating states within the OSCE, through the process of rhetorical action, not only defined its role an identity, but it also had the consequence of recreating new dividing lines within this organization and thus provide the background for the ongoing crisis within the OSCE. In order to prove this, the participating states 'behaviours is used as the independent variable and the change within the organization is the dependent variable. The normative environment was used as an intervening variable to contextualize these dynamics. To understand the impact of the participating states on the transformation of the OSCE, The focus is specifically on the processes of shaming and framing, both actions intended to strategically manipulate the normative foundations of the environment in order to advance the states 'interests.

The model itself was separated in three stages: the design, the development and the outcomes. Each stage of the model was used to present a coherent and complete view of the transformation of the OSCE. The design stage is associated with the period between 1990 and 1992, during which time the participating states redefined the roles and functions of the OSCE and cemented the normative foundations through the Charter for a new Europe and the Helsinki – II Summit, respectively in 1990 and 1992. The development stage is the central element as it is during this period that rhetorical actions mostly occur. To illustrate these processes, this section focused on two debates concerning the future role and identity of the OSCE, the Security Model debates between 1994 and 1996 and the

debates leading to the Istanbul Summit and the Charter for European Security in 1999. The final stage centers around the notion of path dependency where the shaming and framing mechanisms have a powerful influence on the political direction of the organization. To show the extent and the causes of the political crisis within the organization, an analysis of both (i) the budget crisis that started in 2001 and (ii) the chain of events around the panel of eminent persons on strengthening the effectiveness and the relevance of the OSCE between 2004 and 2006 was made.

Chapter III is the empirical demonstration of the model constructed in the previous chapter. It looked at the three different stages presented in the theoretical model. This provided a better empirical understanding of the internal transformations of the OSCE and its external impacts. In the design phase, I tried to show the importance of the normative foundations of the OSCE, through the reaffirmation both in 1990 and 1992 of the essential roles of the Helsinki Final Act principles. This part follows a classical constructivist argument on the role played by norms in international relations. In the development stage, the notion of rhetorical action is introduced to illustrate this mechanism by drawing on the processes of framing and shaming. On the debates concerning the Security Model, it was argued that the EU, along with the United States and Canada, mostly relied on shaming and framing techniques centred on liberal democratic norms to force its conceptions of the OSCE identity. In the end, the Security Model adopted in Lisbon in 1996 reflected, in large parts, the Western states ideas of the OSCE. On the Charter for European Security, the Russian Federation attempted again to impose its own vision of the OSCE by attempting to frame the

debates on the development of politico-military and economic issues rather than those concerning human rights. These attempts were however countered by the EU who insisted on a different frame of reference and the Charter for European Security mostly reaffirms the values and principles of the Helsinki Final Act and does not constitute in itself a step forward for the organization. In the outcome stage, an illustration of the consequences of this particular development was drawn. First, this showed that by forcing a particular frame of reference within the OSCE, the EU and its western allies have alienated a majority of post-soviet states. This also highlighted the responses to this imposed conception, mainly through the Astana appeal and the Moscow Declaration in 2004 where most CIS countries denounced the situation as one that does not offer any benefit to them and that this frame of reference was unacceptable. This led to the dual budget crisis and the actual reform attempts between 2001 and 2006.

The main argument is that, contrary to common assertions, the EU failed to integrate the post-Soviet states into a security community founded on a common identity and a common set of values and norms. Instead, during the development of the OSCE in the 1990s the EU simply forced its own conceptions by manipulating its normative foundations and did not attempt to create a sense of common purpose. This eventually led to a political crisis within the organization. This view reflects the notion that norms were strategically manipulated and not integrated as part of a logic of appropriateness. Yet, this model could be improved by focusing more on the questions of power and influence (Barnett and Duval 2005). This would prove useful in making explicit the efficiency of the

framing and shaming techniques by looking at the context and the strengths of different participating states.

Finally, this study presents several interesting findings on both the OSCE and IGOs in general. First, related to the OSCE, it highlights the root causes of the actual political crisis. By focusing on norms and the behaviours of participating states in a complex dynamic, this project brings forward both the political nature of the crisis and the normative dilemma it poses. As such, this has a clear policy-oriented value by pointing on where to look to reform the organization. By doing this, this study challenges some of the recommendations made by the panel of eminent persons (mainly those that deal with reforming the consensus rules), but it also agrees with their most thoughtful suggestion: to raise the level of awareness towards the organization and to capitalize on the power of public diplomacy. Related to our understanding of IGOs, The model used here points to fruitful research directions, in particular by focusing on the complete life cycle of IGOs. It also redirects the focus of studies on IGOs towards their normative foundations and could make a valuable contribution to the study of contested IGOs where there is no clear consensus on the principles, roles or direction of the specific IGO.

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## *Annex I*

### *List of OSCE Documents*

The OSCE documents are available online (http://www.osce.org/documents/ ), unless they are restricted. However, the actual codification of OSCE Documents only starts in 1994. Therefore, any documents created before 1994 has not yet been codified according to the actual OSCE system and are likely not to be found online. This list mentions only the primary documents used for this study. It does not include the speeches, comments and other decisions made during the annual Ministerial Councils. The amount of documents used from these sources prevented us from including them in this annex. These documents can be found in several consolidated documents called the OSCE Ministerial Council Final Documents. The same applies for the Summits (1990-1999) (http://www.osce.org/mc/13017.html ). Finally, the decisions made by the OSCE are available in the OSCE Annual reports (http://www.osce.org/publications ) Again, the large quantity of relevant OSCE decisions to our study was too important to be presented here.

A – Countries

**Russian Federation**

PC.DEL/97/05
CIO.GAL/91/04 OSCE+
PC.DEL/195/04
PC.DEL/199/04
PC.DEL/205/04
PC.DEL/154/04
PC.DEL/173/04
PC.DEL/1461/03)
PC.DEL/1463/03
SEC.DEL/124/03
PC.DEL/827/03
PC.DEL/599/03
PC.DEL/46/03
PC.DEL/36/03
PC.DEL/263/01
PC.DEL/255/01
SEC.DEL/101/01
PC.DEL/491/1998
PC.DEL 46 / 1999
PC.DEL 90 1999
PC.DEL 152 1999
PC.DEL/161 1999
PC.DEL/535 1999
PC.DEL/717 2001
PC.DEL/3 2001
PC.DEL/195 2001
PC.DEL/254 2001
PC.DEL/431 2001
PC.DEL/678 2001
PC.DEL/718 2001
PC.DEL/741 2001
PC.DEL/742 2001
PC.DEL/839 2001
PC.DEL/932 2001
PC.DEL/951 2001
PC.DEL/9 2002
PC.DEL/493 2002
PC.DEL/605 2002
PC.DEL/663 2002
PC.DEL/830 2002
PC.DEL/929 2002
PC.DEL/912/04 Restr.

**European Union**

PC.DEL/376/04
PC.DEL/373/04
PC.DEL/861/03
SEC.GAL/186/02
PC.DEL/719/02
PC.DEL/722/02
PC.DEL/725/02
PC.DEL/720/02
PC.DEL/475/01
PC.DEL/480/
PC.DEL/478/01
PC.DEL/473/01
PC.DEL/472/01
PC.DEL/474/01
SEC.GAL/99/01 Restr
PC.DEL/27/01
PC.DEL/36/01
PC.DEL/33/01
PC.DEL/24/01
PC.DEL/29/01
PC.DEL/34/01

**United States**

PC.DEL/359/05
PC.DEL/121/02
SEC.GAL/61/00
PC.DEL/396/98
SEC.DEL/201/98
REF.PC/128/97
Pc 104 1995
SC 12 1995
PC DEL 123 1995

B- Organizations

**Commonwealth of Independent States**

PC.DEL/912/04 Restr.
PC.DEL/902/04
PC.DEL/909/04
PC.DEL/908/04
PC.DEL/630/04
SEC.DEL/132/04 Restr
PC.DEL/647/04
PC.DEL/633/04

**Council of Europe**

PC.DEL/923/01
SEC.GAL/256/04 Restr
PC.DEC/670
PC.DEL/308/05 Restr.
CIO.GAL/49/05 OSCE+
PC.DEL/312/05
PC.DEL/309/05 OSCE
PC.DEL/311/05 OSCE+
PC.DEL/314/05 OSCE+
PC.DEC/637
SEC.GAL/83/05 Restr.
PC.DEL/310/05 OSCE+
CIO.GAL/50/05 OSCE+
HCNM.GAL/2/05
PC.DEL/289/05 Restr.
PC.DEL/677/04
PC.DEL/685/04
PC.DEL/680/04
PC.DEL/681/04
PC.DEL/695/04
PC.DEL/682/04
PC.DEL/684/04 Restr
PC.DEL/687/04
PC.DEL/697/04
SEC.DEL/148/04
PC.DEL/896/03/Rev.1
PC.DEL/906/03
SEC.GAL/144/03
PC.DEL/534/03/Rev.1
PC.DEL/568/02
PC.DEL/570/02
PC.DEL/576/02
PC.DEL/578/02
PC.DEL/583/02
SEC.GAL/135/02
PC.DEL/337/02),
PC.DEL/534/01
PC.DEL/532/01
PC.DEL/544/01
PC.DEL/535/01
PC.DEL/540/01
PC.DEL/541/01
SEC.GAL/114/01
SEC.GAL/59/01
SEC.INF/218/00
PC.DEL/208/00
PC.DEL/224/00
PC.DEL/209/00
CIO.GAL/78/99
PC.DEL/353/99
PC.DEL/362/99
PC.DEL/357/99
PC.DEL/507/98
PC.DEL/510/98
CIO.GAL/25/98
PC.DEL/255/98
SEC.DEL/65/98
PC.GAL/22/97
PC.DEL/83/97 Restr
PC.DEL/79/97
REF.PC/72/97
REF.PC/453/96
REF.PC/458/96

**GUUAM**

PC.DEL/335/05
PC.DEL/337/05
PC.DEL/341/05
SEC.DEL/147/01
*SEC.DEL/250/00*
PC.DEL/469/00

**NATO**

SEC.GAL/252/04 OSCE+
PC.DEL/1292/03
PC.DEL/1297/03
PC.DEL/1331/03
PC.DEL/1294/03),
PC.DEL/1293/03
PC.DEL/1319/03
PC.DEL/1318/03

PC.DEL/1295/03
PC.DEL/1316/03
PC.DEL/549/02 PC.DEL/668/00
PC.DEL/669/00
PC.DEL/678/00
PC.DEL/671/00
PC.DEL/237/98)
REF.PC/719/95
REF.PC/730/95

**United Nations**

SEC.GAL/78/05 Restr
PC.DEL/996/04
PC.DEL/1006/04
PC.DEL/1001/04
SEC.GAL/239/04 OSCE+),
SEC.GAL/210/04 Restr.
*CIO.GAL/94/04 Restr*
SEC.GAL/151/04 Restr
SEC.GAL/210/03 Restr.
SEC.GAL/150/03 Restr.
PC.DEL/1009/02
PC.DEL/995/02
PC.DEL/368/99
PC.DEL/369/99
PC.DEL/370/99
SEC.GAL/75/99
PC.DEL/511/98
PC.DEL/270/98
PC.DEL/281/98
SEC.GAL/27/97

C- Others

**30th Anniversary**

PC.DEL/150/05/Corr.1 OSCE+

**Budget**

PC.DEC/665.
SEC.GAL/66/05 OSCE
PC.DEL/172/05
PC.DEL/182/05
PC.DEL/188/05 OSCE+
PC.DEC/635.
SEC.GAL/175/03 Restr.
PC.DEC/553
PC.DEC/554
PC.DEL/751/03
PC.DEC/486
SEC.GAL/43/02)
PC.IFC/24/00 Restr.
SEC.GAL/136/99
PC.IFC/66/98 Restr.,
SEC.GAL/79/98 Restr
PC.DEL/439/98/Rev.1
SEC.GAL/19/98 Restr.,
PC.IFC/21/98 Restr.,
PC.IFC/25/98 Restr
PC.DEL/167/98
PC.IFC/30/98 Restr
REF.PC/638/97
REF.PC/579/97 Restr.
REF.PC/580/97 Restr

**Central Asia**

CIO.GAL/61/99 Restr
PC.DEL/356/99
PC.DEL/361/99
PC.DEL/365/99
PC.DEL/470/98
PC.DEL/405/98

**Economic Dimension**

PC.DEL/336/05
PC.DEL/345/05
SEC.GAL/58/05 OSCE
PC.DEL/145/05
PC.DEL/156/05
PC.DEL/137/05
PC.DEL/1129/03
PC.DEL/1131/03 Restr
PC.DEL/1126/03
PC.DEL/1127/
PC.DEL/1133/03
PC.DEL/1137/03
PC.DEL/1134/03
PC.DEL/1138/03
PC.DEL/1128/03
PC.DEL/1132/03
SEC.GAL/106/00
SEC.GAL/108/00
SEC.GAL/107/00
SEC.GAL/110/00
PC.DEL/465/00
PC.DEL/466/00
REF.PC/706/95
REF.PC/698/95 Restr.,
REF.PC/705/95 Restr
REF.PC/703/95
REF.PC/710/95 Restr
REF.PC/701/95 Restr
PC.DEL 709 2002

**European Security Model**

PC.DEL/388/99
PC.DEL/389/99
PC.DEL/394/99
PC.DEL/397/99
PC.DEL/390/99 Restr
PC.DEL/387/99
PC.DEL/391/99
PC.DEL/392/99
PC.DEL/396/99
PC.DEL/393/99
PC.DEL/395/99
PC.DEL/495/98
PC.DEL/492/98
PC.DEL/494/98
PC.DEL/493/98 Restr
PC.DEL/498/98
PC.DEL/497/98 Restr
PC.DEL/500/98
PC.DEL/499/98
PC.DEL/496/98 Restr
PC.DEL/464/98
PC.DEL/468/98
PC.DEL/334/98 Restr

SEC.GAL/50/98 Restr
PC.DEL/330/98 Restr
PC.DEL/329/98
PC.DEL/333/98
PC.DEL/336/98
PC.DEL/339/98 Restr
PC.DEL/340/98
PC.DEL/341/98 Restr
PC.DEL/335/98 Restr
PC.DEL/331/98 Restr
PC.DEL/342/98
PC.DEL/332/98 Restr
PC.DEL/338/98 Restr
PC.DEL/337/98

PC.DEL/95/98 Restr
PC.DEL/98/98
PC.DEL/106/98
PC.DEL/100/98
PC.DEL/105/98
PC.DEL/99/98
PC.DEL/108/98
PC.DEL/107/98
PC.DEL/109/98
PC.DEL/110/98
PC.DEL/112/98
PC.DEC/221
CIO.GAL/4/98 Restr.
PC.SMC/24/97 Restr
PC.SMC/19/97 Restr
PC.SMC/21/97),
PC.SMC/17/97 Restr
PC.SMC/32/97 Restr
PC.SMC/31/97 Restr
PC.SMC/25/97 Restr
PC.SMC/22/97 Restr
PC.SMC/28/97),
PC.SMC/18/97 Restr
PC.SMC/27/97 Restr
PC.SMC/30/97
PC.SMC/20/97 Restr
PC.SMC/29/97
PC.SMC/23/97
PC.SMC/26/97 Restr
PC.DEC/163
PC.DEC/65

**Human rights dimension**

PC.DEL/92/04
PC.DEL/104/04
PC.DEL/88/04
PC.DEL/101/04

**Terrorism**

PC.DEC/617
SEC.GAL/27/04 OSCE+
PC.DEL/1376/03/Rev.1
PC.DEL/1388/03
PC.DEL/1394/03
SEC.GAL/207/03 Restr
SEC.GAL/164/03 Restr.
SEC.GAL/155/03 Restr.
CIO.GAL/49/02 Restr
PC.DEL/478/02
PC.DEL/473/02
PC.DEL/476/02 Restr
PC.DEL/482/02/Corr.1
PC.DEL/480/02
PC.DEL/485/02
PC.DEL/483/02
PC.DEL/484/02
PC.DEL/486/02
PC.DEL/454/02
PC.DEL/443/02)
CIO.GAL/19/02
ODIHR.GAL/20/02/Corr.1
FOM.GAL/6/02
PA.GAL/3/02
PC.DEL/241/02
PC.DEL/262/02
PC.DEL/250/02
PC.DEL/259/02
PC.DEL/267/02 Restr.
PC.DEL/263/02
PC.DEL/255/02
PC.DEL/254/02
PC.DEL/266/02
PC.DEL/257/02
PC.DEL/258/02
PC.DEL/253/02
PC.DEL/261/02
CIO.GAL/21/02
PC.DEL/213/02
*SEC.GAL/35/02*
SEC.GAL/36/02
PC.DEL/710/01
CIO.GAL/45/01
PC.DEL/696/01 Restr

PC.DEL/686/01
PC.DEL/694/01
PC.DEL/695/01
SEC.GAL/172/01
PC.DEL/656/01
PC.DEL/659/01
PC.DEL/648/01
PC.DEL/647/01
PC.DEL/291 2004
REF.PC/566/96 Restr.

**Relevance of the OSCE**

CIO.GAL/50/01
PC.DEL/737/01
PC.DEL/748/01
PC.DEL/736/01
PC.DEL/738/01
PC.DEL/735/01
PC.DEL/747/01
PC.DEL/732/01
PC.DEL/734/01
PC.DEL/750/01
PC.DEL/743/01
PC.DEL/740/01
PC.DEL/746/01
PC.DEL/745/01
PC.DEL/744/01
PC.DEL/733/01
PC.DEL/755/01
PC.DEL/697/01
PC.DEL/698/01
PC.DEL/699/01
PC.DEL/700/01
PC.DEL/701/01
PC.DEL/702/01
PC.DEL/706/01/Rev.1
PC.DEL/753/01
PC.DEL/749/01
PC.DEL/751/01
PC.DEL/754/01
SEC.GAL/200/01
PC.DEL/378/01
PC.DEL/391/01
PC.DEL/376/01
PC.DEL/375/01 Restr.
PC.DEL/382/01
PC.DEL/390/01
PC.DEL/379/01
CIO.GAL/26/01 Restr.
PC.DEL/558/01
CIO.GAL/32/01 Restr.

**Stability Pact**

PC.DEL/302/01
PC.DEL/294/01
PC.DEL/309/01
REF.PC/406/95
REF.PC/401/95 Restr